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Abstract 
 
Most low-income countries have experienced significant difficulties to raise non-trade 
taxes sufficiently to replace trade tax revenues forgone in the context of trade 
liberalization over recent decades.  This is in contrast to nearly all high-income countries 
having been able to reduce trade tax revenues to very low levels while raising total 
revenue yields.  Using an extensive database of central government tax revenues and 
other economic indicators for 123 countries over the period 1975-2000, various tax 
strategies of these countries are analyzed.  Out of these countries, 101 experienced 
declines in their trade tax yields, of which 54 raised non-trade taxes to fully offset the 
loss in trade tax revenues and a further 23 managed to partially offset these trade tax 
losses.   Out of 39 low-income countries, 28 experienced trade tax yield declines, but 
only 6 were able to fully replace these losses and a further 10 partially replaced the trade 
tax losses with non-trade taxes.    
 
The complex structure and changes in import tariffs are reviewed to act as a basis for 
showing that much of the loss of tax revenues has come about through cuts in the tariffs 
on capital goods, raw materials and intermediate inputs, particularly in the context of the 
formation of trading blocs among lower income countries.  This has resulted in revenue 
losses accompanied by higher efficiency costs from the increased import protection.   It 
also points to one of the causes for the VAT or general sales tax (which falls on domestic 
consumption) having difficulty in replacing the loss of revenues from lower import duties 
on inputs to industry.   Cases are drawn from experiences of countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Reforms in the sequencing of trade policy changes in the formation of trading 
blocs and restructuring the common external tariffs back towards low, but more uniform 
tariff schedules are key recommendations.  
 
The determinants of limited tax capacity in lower income countries are also estimated 
using the 123 country database. A particular focus on the limits arising from the large 
informal sectors in low-income countries that cause significant administrative and 
compliance cost barriers to the modern broad-based self-assessed income tax and VAT.  
Large informal sectors also contribute to low VAT efficiencies in low-income countries 
and lead to higher price responsiveness of the VAT bases in these countries.  Many low-
income countries introduced the VAT to replace sales or turnover taxes, and hence, 
already charge relative high tax rates.  The combined effects of narrow VAT bases, 
already high rates, high price responsiveness of the base, and import duty cuts largely 
targeted at business inputs have limited the ability of the VAT to replace trade taxes. 
 
With large and growing informal sectors, particularly in urban areas, in low-income 
countries, the importance of innovation in the taxation of the informal sector to enhance 
revenues and economic efficiency is emphasized.  A combination of tax strategies using 
both indirect taxation of the inputs into informal sector through the VAT and import tariff 
and simple direct presumptive taxes is required depending upon the structure of an 
economy.   To enhance cost-effectiveness, presumptive taxes should be administered by 
local authorities with co-ordination and oversight provided by central tax agencies.  
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Increased efforts should also be made to study and measure the size and nature of the 
informal sector in lower income countries along with the costs of tax administration and 
compliance in these sectors. 
 
While the primary focus of the study is on the ability of lower income to use non-trade 
taxes to substitute for trade taxes, consideration is given to the full range fiscal 
adjustment paths that a country could follow in adjusting to the loss of trade tax revenues 
efficiently.  These adjustments include the use of non-tax revenues and foreign aid, sub-
national revenues, changing the size and organization of government, and enhancing tax 
administration efficiency and effectiveness.   
 
Finally, the need for ongoing concerted work to build better, more accurate detailed fiscal 
data bases is noted to allow more comprehensive analyses to be undertaken of the fiscal 
adjustments that countries have undertaken over the long run. 
                                                                  iv
Contents 
 
Section                                                                                      Page 
 
   1. Introduction             1 
 
2 Overview of international trends in trade tax and  
total tax revenue             3 
 
   3 Disaggregated view of trade tax and total tax revenues by country      8 
 
  4 Trade taxes and trade liberalization strategies       16 
 
  5 Limits on tax capacity in low-income countries      21 
 
   6 Limits on VAT as revenue substitute for trade tax revenue     30 
 
   7 Efficient trade taxes and tax alternatives       33 
 
   8 Alternative fiscal adjustment channels       37 
 
   9 Recommendations          42 
 
References            44 
 
Appendices 
 
   A Characteristics of trade tax sample 
 
   B Annual average tax and trade tax yields, 1975-2000 
 
   C Effect of country size on imports and trade taxes as a share of GDP 
 
   D Average trade and total tax adjustments over 1975-2000 for each country 
 
   E Estimations of tax capacity 
 
   F Malawi:  A case of ineffective high standard surtax rates 
 
  
 
 
 
  
                                                                  1
 
Towards fiscally feasible and efficient trade liberalization 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Over recent decades most countries have been liberalizing their trade regimes, including 
reducing duties on international trade.   Revenues from trade taxes as a share of GDP 
have fallen.  Not all countries, however, have been able to sustain their overall tax 
revenues as a share of GDP.  This is particularly the case amongst low-income countries, 
but also remains an issue amongst middle-income countries.  The problem of trade tax 
revenues tends to be more acute amongst low-income countries as trade taxes tend to 
form a higher share of total revenues of countries with lower per capita incomes.   
 
The difficulty of non-high income or non-industrialized countries to replace trade tax 
revenue losses has become recognized more sharply in recent studies such as Ebrill et al 
(1999) and Khattry and Roa (2002).   The issue has been stated most starkly in 
Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) (hereafter referred to as B&K (2005)).  They found that, 
based on analysis of central government tax collection data for 1975-2000 for 125 
countries that, on average, low-income countries1 recovered at best 30% of losses in 
trade taxes as a share of GDP through increased non-trade taxes, while middle-income 
countries recovered some 45% to 60% of trade tax losses.  By contrast, high-income 
countries managed to more than replace any losses in trade taxes with non-trade tax 
revenues when measured as a share of GDP.  These results are found by estimating the 
long-run recovery in non-trade taxes as a share of GDP from the year-to-year adjustments 
arising in response to changes in trade tax revenues as a share of GDP.  The study also 
finds that the presence of a VAT does not appear to play a significant role in increasing 
non-trade tax revenues to replace trade tax losses.  This is significant as the VAT is often 
presented as a tax tool to accomplish this task.  Importantly, the study also recognizes 
significant diversity in the response of different countries to changes in trade tax 
revenues.  For example, some low-income countries in the sample did have reasonable 
revenue recovery rates averaging closer to 100%, but this group only formed 6 out of the 
40 low-income countries.2  Finally, the B&K (2005) study, as do Khattry and Roa (2002), 
raises the issue of whether it is economically wise for low-income countries to aim for 
virtual elimination of trade taxes as a revenue source as has happened over recent decades 
with the high-income industrial countries. 
 
This study uses the B&K (2005) data set with some minor additions as well as other data 
available from the authors experience in working on tax reforms with various 
governments, particularly in Sub Saharan Africa, to explore the nature of the importance 
of trade taxes and the patterns of tax adjustment that occurred both on average for groups 
of countries in section 2 and individually by each country in section 3.  This helps 
                                                 
1 The classification of countries follows the World Bank classification based on per capita GNI in 2003 US 
dollars:  low income countries , $765 or less; lower middle income, between $765 and $3,035; upper 
middle income, between $3,036 and $9,385; and high income, $9,386 and above 
2 Six low-income countries estimated to have replaced trade tax losses: Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, 
Malawi, Pakistan and Zambia.  
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motivate the recognition that tax choices are complex and, in a non-ideal world, the 
second-best choices that governments make in the face of complex economic structures 
and policies.  One of the most complex tax structures is, in fact, the trade tax structure, 
which makes it hard to characterize with a single variable, something that Ebril et al 
(1999) discuss at length.  Here the nature of trade liberalization is briefly reviewed in 
section 4 in order to highlight the complexity of relationships between trade tax 
structures, trade tax revenue and the economic efficiency consequences.  Importantly, it 
helps highlight the new import tariff realities that are now facing many low-income 
countries in the context of forming regional trading blocs.  The protective trade policy 
strategies in many trading blocs of lower income countries are leading to high revenue 
losses accompanied by increased economic efficiency costs.   
 
The discussion of trade taxes forms a useful springboard to the issue of why the VAT has 
difficulty in acting as a revenue-replacement tax for trade taxes.  In part, this arises 
because of the structure of tax and the fundamental difference between the bases for trade 
taxes and a consumption-based VAT.  Another major part arises from the difficulty in 
raising tax revenues out of the economic structures that characterize the low-income 
countries, particularly the existence of large informal sectors that are difficult to tax.  
Section 5 goes into some detailed analysis of the tax capacity limits of lower income 
countries, particularly the effects of large informal sectors, as well as the implications of 
these economic structure limits on VAT collection efficiencies.  Section 6 uses the 
discussion of the nature of trade taxes and liberalization strategies, along with the tax 
capacity limits of lower income countries to analyze the limits of the VAT to replace 
losses in trade tax revenues.   
 
In the context of low-income countries with large informal sectors, the issues of the 
economic costs of administration and taxpayer compliance loom large and typically 
overwhelm considerations of the allocative economic efficiency costs of different tax 
policies.  What are the efficient options of taxing the informal sector indirectly as well as 
directly?  Are there other fiscal channels other than tax policy – strengthening tax 
administration, expenditure adjustments, non-tax revenues, foreign aid, for example – 
that can be used to adjust to the loss of trade tax revenues.  This leads to some discussion 
of the fiscal options that low-income countries need to consider as well as an agenda for 
tax policy analysis to develop more efficient tax structures for low-income countries that 
reflect their structural realities with the objective of moving towards fiscally feasible and 
efficient trade liberalization.  Section 7 discusses both the need to make trade taxes more 
revenue efficient, particularly in the context of the growing number of trading bloc 
arrangements involving lower income countries, and the need to seek ways of taxing the 
large informal sectors either indirectly through the VAT or import duties, or directly 
through efficient and effective presumptive taxes, or some combination of both 
approaches.  Section 8 widens the scope of the analysis to recognize the range of 
alternative fiscal adjustment channels other than tax enhancements that a country can use 
to adjust efficiently to losses in trade tax revenues, including adjustments the non-tax 
revenues, sub-national revenues, the size and structure of the public sector, and 
improvements in tax administration and compliance. 
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Finally, section 9 provides recommendations to improve the interrelationship between 
trade liberalization and tax revenues, and to enhance the understanding of how to achieve 
more cost-effective tax administration and compliance. 
 
 
2.  Overview of international trends in trade tax and total tax revenue  
 
B&K kindly made the data set used in their study available for this study.  These data 
cover 125 countries over 1975-2000.  Getting accurate tax data for a large number of 
countries over extended time periods is a very difficult task.  This data set is described in 
Appendix A along with some discussion of other adjustments and issues with the data as 
well as related international tax databases.  The sample of countries includes 59% of all 
countries, 81% of the world population, and 91% of the world GDP. 3   The sample 
includes the two most populous countries, China and India, and also all the high-income 
OECD or industrial countries, which account for 79% of GDP even though they only 
contain 15% of the world population.  The main grouping of countries excluded from the 
sample is the transitional or former socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
as well as Russia.  This results in lower representation in the upper middle-income group.  
For transitional economies there are problems both with getting data over the 1975-2000 
period and with the major shifts in economic policy that have occurred particularly 
starting in the 1990s.  In addition, there is low representation in the high-income non-
OECD group, but this is largely formed of many small economies, which only constitute 
about 1% of the world population and about 2% of the world GDP.    
 
Overall, the sample of countries can be taken as sufficiently representative to draw 
conclusions about major trends in trade and overall taxation across countries.  It is of 
interest to note some regional concentrations amongst the income groupings.  The low-
income group is dominated in terms of number of countries by the Sub-Saharan African 
region forming 78% of the countries (see Table A.2 in Appendix A), but the South Asian 
countries within the Asia and Pacific region (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and 
Bhutan) dominate the group in terms of its population (72%) and economic size (79% of 
GDP).  Lower middle-income countries are fairly well distributed across regions with the 
largest share in the Caribbean and Latin America countries in the Western Hemisphere 
region (34%), but the income group is dominated by the Asia and Pacific region, which 
includes China and Indonesia, in terms of population (80%) and size of economy (67% of 
GDP).  The upper-middle income country sample is dominated Caribbean and Latin 
America countries in the Western Hemisphere region, which form about 71% of the 
sample by all three measures.  Among the high-income OECD countries, European 
countries form 75% of the sample, but the countries from the Western and Asian and 
Pacific regions combine to contribute 66% of the economic activity in the sample.  The 
implications of some of these weights in the country sample will become evident in the 
need to take some care about describing international trends or conclusions.  What may 
be true for the average or typical country may not be true when weighted by the size of 
economies as being representative of what is happening in the world economy. 
                                                 
3 The GDP measure used is GDP in US dollars in 2000. 
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Some broad trends in total tax and trade tax revenues 
To get an overview of the average magnitude and variability of total tax yields (ratio of 
tax revenues to GDP), and yields of trade taxes (import and export taxes), the total taxes 
of the central governments of 123 countries in the B&K (2005) database are calculated 
for each year (1975 to 2000) for the countries in each of five country income groups:  
low, lower middle, upper middle, high non-OECD and high OECD.4  These results are 
given in Appendix B along with the number of countries for which data are available in 
each year.  The average trade tax and (total) tax yields for the countries in each income 
group in each year are calculated in two ways:  first, the average of the country tax yields 
(which represents the “average country”) and, second, the GDP weighted average yield 
(which is equivalent to the tax yield for the group of countries treated as a whole – the 
aggregate revenues divided by the aggregate GDP for the group).  The former gives a 
good estimate if “country” is the unit of focus, but the latter gives a better estimate if the 
international magnitude of the fiscal problem for groups of countries is of interest. 
 
A number of observations can be drawn from the Tables B.1 for (total) taxes and Table 
B.2 for trade taxes: 
 
1. Total tax yields rise markedly moving from low to high income groups except 
for the high-income non-OECD group which contains a number of small 
resource rich economies relying on non-tax revenues.  Only the high-income 
OECD country group shows a marked and consistent picture of revenue 
increases over the period.  The reasons are discussed below. 
 
2. Within an income group, the country average yields tend to be about 10% to 
20% higher than the GDP-weighted averages meaning that there some smaller 
countries with higher than average tax yields, and typically the larger 
countries have lower tax yields.  This possibly reflects in part the larger 
countries having higher shares of sub-national government revenues.  The 
problems caused by the tax data only including central government revenues 
are discussed further in section 8 below.  When all countries are taken 
together, the reverse happens – the typical country is only raising 20% of GDP 
in taxes, but the aggregate tax yield in the world is about 30% of GDP because 
of the dominance of the high-income economies also collecting higher than 
average tax yields. 
 
3. When trade tax yields are compared across countries there is only a sharp drop 
amongst the high-income OECD group compared to the rest; otherwise there 
is no obvious pattern amongst the rest. 
 
4. When trade taxes are compared over time, all groups on both trade tax yield 
averages show a noticeable decline. 
 
                                                 
4 Brunei and Myanmar are excluded from the database for lack of some basic economic indicators.  See 
Appendix A.  
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5. Average country trade tax yields are significantly higher (anywhere from 50% 
to 200% higher) than the GDP-weighted trade tax yields within any income 
group and year, except for the high income OECD group in the last few years.  
This reflects the occurrence of high trade tax usage amongst some smaller 
countries within each group that skews the distribution of country trade tax 
yields significantly to the right.  This issue of the diversity of the use of trade 
taxes will be expanded upon considerably below. 
 
6. In the earlier years of the sample, particularly, 1975-1977, tax data for a 
significant number of low and middle-income countries are missing and 
appears to be biasing the yields downwards, particularly for the trade tax 
yields. 
 
7. The average magnitude of the trade tax revenue problem (in terms of revenue 
replacement) has dropped from around 3-4% of GDP for the low, 2%-3% of 
GDP for middle, and 0.5% of GDP for the high income group to around 2.5%, 
1% and 0.1%, respectively.  Given the total tax yields generally rise with 
increasing income, trade taxes as a share of tax revenues decline even more 
steeply.  Table B.3 shows trade taxes declining from 23% of low-income 
country tax revenues in 2000 to only 0.4% of the tax revenues of high-income 
OECD countries. 
 
The drop in trade tax revenues both as shares of GDP and as shares of total tax revenues 
over the 1975-2000 period begs the question of whether countries could and did replace 
these revenues.  This question is first looked at based on the income-group average data 
presented in Appendix B, and then subsequently in a more disaggregated and detailed 
way below.   In line with B&K (2005), the question of whether these trade tax revenues 
have been replaced by other non-trade taxes is looked at first.  This assumes that 
governments are taking tax-financing decisions in a separable way from the broad 
choices of all sources of government finance.  These broad choices and their impacts are 
raised later below.    
 
Here, as a starter, it is assumed that governments would want to replace the trade taxes 
with non-tax revenues and that governments are trying to sustain their total tax yield over 
time.  For example, one such outcome would be that the decline in trade tax yield would 
be completely or nearly completely recovered by raising non-trade tax revenues such that 
the total tax yield remains approximately constant over time.  If the tax yield declines by 
less than the trade tax loss then partial replacement is achieved.  It is also recognized that 
tax structure adjustments take place gradually over many years and in the short-run is 
subject to many economic and policy shocks.  Therefore, it is reasonable to characterize 
countries or groups of countries by their tax yield trends over lengthy periods.5  
                                                 
5 Estimating the trends in total and trade tax yields over the whole sample period (1975-2000) assumes that 
each country is following some long-term fiscal strategy over the entire period.   For most countries, this 
appears to be a reasonable characterization, but clearly for some, the fiscal strategies changed over the 
period, sometimes through major policy changes, and sometimes through significant regimes changes, as 
occurs during and after periods of major civil conflict. 
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Accordingly, Table 1 summarizes the annual tax yield figures based on the simple 
estimated trends in tax yields over 1975-2000 and based on these trends the effective tax 
yields at the beginning (1975) and end of the period (2000) and at the mid-point are 
estimated.  It also allows the shares of trade taxes in total tax revenue to be estimated.  
The estimated trends for low- and middle-income countries are based on 1979-2000 to 
avoid the significant shares of missing data in the earlier years in these groups (See 
Appendix B, Tables B.1 and B.2.).  The estimated tax yields in 1975 and 2000 allow 
estimated changes in the (total) tax and trade tax yields to be estimated for the countries 
in each income group and check the degree of replacement.   
 
The results presented in Table 1 show trade tax yields falling over 1975-2000 in all 
income groups of countries with the largest declines in the lower income groups.  
Similarly, marked declines occurred in the shares of trade taxes in total tax revenues.  As 
above, significant differences in results arise between estimates for the average country 
and those weighted by the GDPs of the sample countries.  Total tax yields, however, only 
rose for the lower middle-income and high-income OECD country groups when 
measured on an average country basis, and only for the high-income OECD country 
group when measured on a GDP-weighted base.  Only the high-income OECD country 
group showed complete replacement of trade tax losses by both measures.  High-income 
non-OECD showed partial replacement on a GDP-weighted-average basis, and lower 
middle-income countries displayed full replacement on an average-country basis, but no 
replacement on a GDP-weighted-average basis.  The results for the low and middle-
income groups are internally inconsistent and clearly the groupings are covering up some 
diversity in underlying tax adjustments.  These are explored below. 
 
The consistent and clear result for the high-income OECD or industrial countries is not 
surprising.  It is consistent with B&K (2005) results and with the long-run evidence for 
these countries.   For example, Tanzi and Schukenecht (2000) studied the public sector 
financial operations of the OECD countries from 1870 through 1995.  This long-term 
study showed that up till World War I, trade taxes averaged about 1.7% of GDP and 
formed about 15% to 20% of revenues of all levels of government.  Trade taxes then rose 
to about 2.2% in the 1930s, but fell to about 10% of government revenues as total 
revenues had doubled from around 11% to 22% of GDP from their pre-World War I 
levels by the 1930s.  After World War II, under the co-ordination of GATT and WTO, 
trade taxes amongst the OECD countries declined to about 0.5% of GDP by 1995, 
consistent with results in Table 1 that shows trade tax yields below 0.2% of GDP by 
2000.  Total taxes as a share of GDP continued to increase after World War II, doubling 
again to about 44% by 1995.   The introduction of general sales taxes, and later the VAT, 
increased indirect domestic taxes from about 3% of GDP to nearly 14% of GDP over the 
whole time period.   The bulk of the total tax increase, however, came from the direct 
taxes, a combination of income taxes and pay roll taxes that rose to over 26% of GDP, or 
about double the yield of the indirect domestic taxes.   Clearly, the replacement of trade 
tax revenues was not a revenue problem.  Expansion in either income- or domestic 
consumption-based tax revenues far exceeded the revenue losses, though the increase in 
the former was about double that of the latter. 
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LIC LMIC UMIC
HI  Non-
OECD HI  OECD ALL
Average country trade tax yield
1975 6.27 5.48 6.56 4.97 1.13 4.19
2000 3.22 3.86 3.67 3.00 0.16 3.26
Increase -3.05 -1.63 -2.88 -1.98 -0.97 -0.93
GDP-weighted average trade tax yield
1975 4.21 2.83 2.94 2.28 0.48 0.66
2000 2.79 1.17 1.14 0.77 0.19 0.39
Increase -1.42 -1.66 -1.80 -1.51 -0.29 -0.27
Average country tax yield
1975 16.20 16.23 23.64 12.81 33.35 22.28
2000 13.10 18.59 20.36 9.97 38.59 20.15
Increase -3.10 2.37 -3.28 -2.84 5.23 -2.14
GDP-weighted average tax yield
1975 13.32 16.44 17.59 11.64 29.12 28.27
2000 10.00 14.31 13.88 11.27 32.70 30.11
Increase -3.32 -2.13 -3.70 -0.38 3.57 1.84
Trade tax shares
For average country
1975 39% 34% 28% 39% 3.4% 19%
2000 25% 21% 18% 30% 0.4% 16%
For weighted average country
1975 32% 17% 17% 20% 1.7% 2.3%
2000 28% 8% 8% 7% 0.6% 1.3%
Replacement of trade tax revenues
For average country
-1% 245% -14% -44% 640% -129%
For weighted average
-133% -29% -106% 75% 1323% 778%
                                                                       = Increase in non-trade tax yeld / Decrease in trade tax yield
Table 1.   Estimated changes in trade tax and total tax yields over 1975-2000 and degree to 
which trade tax revenue losses are replaced by non-tax revenues, calculated for the average 
country and weighted by country GDPs within each income group
LIC = Low income country; LMIC = Lower middle income country; UMIC = Upper middle income country; HI Non-
OECD = High income, non-OECD country; HI OECD = High income OECD country
Tax yield = tax revenues over GDP
Replacement of trade tax revenues = (Increase in tax yield - Increase in trade tax yield) / Decrease in trade tax yield
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In general, this reduction in trade tax revenues among the OECD countries was a long 
and slow process over many decades and, for most states, started from relatively modest 
trade tax yields.  The replacement of these forgone trade taxes was clearly a minor 
revenue issue for these industrial countries.  The trade liberalization in the post-World 
War II period, however, clearly played a role in the ongoing expansion of international 
trade, particularly for the industrial economies until about the last decade. The IMF 
reports in the World Economic Outlook Database that from 1970 through 2005 world 
trade expanded consistently faster than world GDP such that world trade over world GDP 
rose from 23.3% in 1970 to 33.9% in 1975, to 49.6% in 2000 and 57.2% in 2005.   Over 
most of the period the bulk of these trade benefits accrued to the advanced economies.   
From 1980 through 2000, the share of world GDP of the advanced economies rose from 
56.4% in 1980 to a peak of 68.5% in the early 1990s, but since then has been declining to 
66.7% in 2000 and 61.7% in 2005 as the rapid economic growth rates in China, India and 
other emerging economies have started to give these economies noticeably higher shares 
of the world economic activity.  Similarly, the trade shares of advanced economies had 
risen from about 47% in 1980 to a peak of about 52% in the early 1990s and then 
declined to about 48% in 2000 and 42% by 2005.   
 
The issue about the nature of fiscal response to trade liberalization and trade tax yield 
declines remains for the low and middle-income countries.   Table 1 shows middle-
income countries had trade tax yields in 2000 some two to three times higher than the 
high-income in 1975.  In 2000, low-income countries had similar trade tax yields to 
middle-income countries on an average country basis, but more than twice the trade tax 
yield when GDP-weighted-average trade tax yields are compared.  In addition, as 
discussed above it is clear from Table 1 that studying the fiscal adjustment on the basis of 
group averages for these countries is masking significant underlying diversity in their 
trade tax and total tax experiences over 1975-2000.  Hence, the remainder of this study 
focuses on better understanding the diversity of fiscal experience of these countries, the 
difficulties these countries face in raising alternative non-tax revenues, and potential 
directions for improving their tax structures. 
 
3.  Disaggregated view of trade tax and total tax revenues by country 
 
The average results above suggest that there would be benefit from looking at more 
disaggregated country-by-country experiences rather than group averages.  Given that 
B&K database for 1975-2000 affords up to 26 years of observations per country, 
considerable information exists on the tax experience at a country level in these data.   
 
The first issue noted above was the major difference between the country averages and 
the GDP-weighted averages for trade tax yields amongst low and middle-income 
countries.  This result is expected because typically trade as a share of GDP tends to fall 
off as the size of an economy gets larger.  This arises both because trade gets internalized 
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as a country or trade area is enlarged, and because the larger economies tend to be more 
diversified and can self supply a larger share of demand.  Small countries are often highly 
specialized in their industrial structures, and hence, need to import a high share of inputs.  
For example, an island tourism-based economy tends to satisfy a large share of demand 
through imports.  This result can be confirmed by running some simple regressions using 
the B&K data.  See Appendix C.  Goods imports as a share of GDP tend to decline with 
size (as measured by population and/or real GDP) and grow with GDP per capita.  Trade 
tax yields tend to grow with goods import shares, but decline with the size of the 
economy (as measured by real GDP or population).    Similar conclusions are drawn from 
observing which countries displayed high tax yields over the sample period.    
 
As discussed above, each country is characterized by its trend rate of change of its trade 
tax and its total tax yields over the sample period.  This allows estimates of changes in 
trade tax and tax yields over the sample period and the mid-point average trade tax and 
tax yields to be made.  Initially, we are interested in the countries that on average had 
high trade tax yields, arbitrary defined at 6% of GDP (somewhat less than one standard 
deviation above the country-average trade tax yield).  This nets 24 countries given in 
Table 2.  These countries are also highlighted in Tables D.1 through D.5 in Appendix D.  
These countries had average trade tax yields over 6% over the sample period and, when 
individual years are observed, had trade tax yields of over 6% in about 18 years each on 
average.  Twenty of these countries are islands, and all except a few are very small 
countries with populations of about one million or less.  The remaining four (Cote 
d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Senegal and Tunisia) are somewhat larger countries with Tunisia 
being the largest with a population of about 9.5 million and GDP of US$19.5 billion in 
2000.   
 
In addition to these countries, Table 3 lists all countries with at least one year in which 
the trade tax yield exceeded 6% of GDP.  A further 30 countries fall in this category with 
an average of 5 years with trade tax yields over 6%.  Of these, 6 are small islands with 
populations of about one million or less, including Iceland, a high-income OECD 
country.  The remainders are mostly relatively small economies with GDPs in 2000 of 
$10billion or less.  Only five were larger, with Malaysia at $90.3billion and Egypt at 
$99.4 billion having the largest GDPs in 2000.   Most of the incidences of high trade tax 
yields occurred in the earlier part of the sample period with subsequent tariff cuts 
reducing the average trade tax yield below 6%.   
 
Whether these high trade tax cases for small countries makes sense in terms of the 
allocative efficiency and transaction costs of tax collection in the cases of the very small 
countries will be discussed further below.  Overall it is clear, however, that this group of 
countries skews upwards the distribution of trade tax yields by country without being of    
much weight in the world economy.    
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. 
Average tax 
yield over 1975-
2000        (%)
Average trade tax 
yield over 1975-
2000        (%)
Trade tax revenue 
as share of total 
tax revenue (%)
High income non -OECD countries
Bahamas 16.4 10.2 62%
Upper middle income countries
Seychelles 34.8 16.1 46%
Belize 20.5 10.8 53%
Mauritius 19.0 9.0 47%
St. Kitts & Nevis 21.3 7.1 33%
St. Lucia 22.3 7.0 32%
Lower middle income countries
Vanuatu 20.0 14.0 70%
Kiribati 21.6 13.7 63%
Samoa 27.2 13.0 48%
Maldives 14.9 9.4 63%
Tonga 18.0 8.8 49%
Equatorial Guinea 14.7 7.7 53%
Suriname 22.3 7.5 33%
Swaziland 28.4 7.4 26%
Tunisia 24.7 7.0 28%
Low income countries
Solomon Islands 21.4 12.5 59%
Lesotho 33.9 10.3 30%
Gambia 19.8 10.0 50%
Sâo Tomé & Principe 18.1 7.9 44%
Comoros 11.3 7.1 63%
Togo 18.6 7.0 38%
Côte d'Ivoire 19.0 6.9 36%
Senegal 16.7 6.6 39%
Mauritania 17.1 6.5 38%
Income group and country
Table 2.  Countries with high trade tax yields on average over 1975-2000
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It should be noted, however, before leaving this group of countries that there can also be 
upward “biases” in the trade tax revenues to GDP of some of these countries.  The bias 
comes from some significant external imbalances in some economies.  The demand in an 
economy, and hence imports, depends upon the gross national disposable income 
(GNDI), which in some countries may be significantly higher than GDP because of a 
combination of net inflows of foreign transfers (whether foreign aid or nationals working 
abroad repatriating their wages) and/or foreign factor income.  This phenomenon is most 
extreme in the case of Lesotho where GDNI income has often exceeded GDP by more 
than 50%.  It is also a significant factor for economies such as Namibia and Swaziland.6   
The next step in the disaggregated analysis of the adjustments in trade and total taxes 
over the sample periods is to observe the changes in tax yields by each country over 
1975-2000 based on the trend in the tax yields over this period.  The results of this 
                                                 
6 See Glenday (2005) where Table 6.7 shows GDNI-to-GDP ratios for 1992-96 and 1997-01 for Lesotho of 
186.7% and 144.1%, for Swaziland of  199.4% and 112.4%,  and for Namibia of 114.5% and 114.8%.  
Country Number of years
Fiji 13
Benin 12
Sri Lanka 11
Egypt 9
Zambia 8
St. Vincent and Grenadines 8
Malaysia 8
Jordan 8
Gabon 8
Papua New Guinea 7
Dominican Republic 7
Grenada 6
Sierra Leone 5
Namibia 4
Kenya 4
Cameroon 4
Burundi 4
Burkina Faso 4
Uganda 3
Barbados 3
Zimbabwe 2
Rwanda 2
Guyana 2
Central Afr.Rep. 2
Iceland 1
Honduras 1
Ghana 1
El Salvador 1
Congo, Rep. of 1
Table 3.  Countries with more than one year with 
trade tax yield above 6% of GDP
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analysis for the 123 countries in the B&K sample are presented in five tables in Appendix 
D, one for each of the five income groups (low, lower middle, upper middle, high non-
OECD and high OECD) and also divided into regional groupings (Sub-Saharan Africa, 
North Africa & Middle East, Asia & Pacific, Western Hemisphere and Europe.)  Within 
each of these income and regional groups, countries are divided into three major patterns  
of trade tax and total tax yield adjustment over the sample period, only one of which 
corresponds to the trade tax revenue reduction with replacement by non-tax revenue 
increases. 
 
The three patterns of tax revenue adjustments observed from the trends in tax yields are: 
 
1. Trade tax yield reduction with either complete or partial replacement by 
non-trade taxes.  Complete replacement is observed when the change in trade 
tax yield is negative, but change in total tax yield is positive.  Partial 
replacement is observed when the reduction in total tax yield is less than the 
reduction in the trade tax yield. 
2. Both trade tax yields AND non-trade tax yields declined.   These cases are 
observed when the trade tax yield was reduced, but the reduction in total tax 
yield was even higher. 
3. Trade tax yields increased, with either an increase in total tax revenues or 
a decrease in total tax revenues.  Where total tax yields rose, the trade taxes 
either completely offset a non-trade tax decline or contributed to increase in 
all tax revenues. Where total tax yields declined, the trade tax yield increases 
offset some of the decline.   
 
The detailed country-by-country results for the tax yield trends over the sample period 
are provided in Tables D.1-D.5 in Appendix D and summarized in Table 4 below.  These 
disaggregated results show a significant diversity of trade and total tax adjustment across 
countries, but some trends can be observed as well.  Out of the 123 countries, 101 or 82% 
of countries decreased trade tax yields over 1975-2000, but the remaining 22 actually 
increased their trade tax yields.   Out of those with trade tax yield decreases, 54 
completely replaced the trade tax revenue losses and experienced increases in total tax 
yields, 23 partially replaced these losses and had declines in total tax yields, and the 
remaining 24 had decreases in non-trade taxes as well, and hence, had declines in total 
tax yields.  Out of the 22 with trade yield increases, 14 countries had increases in total tax 
yields so that the trade tax increases contributed to these total tax increases, while the 
remaining 8 had declines in total tax yields so that the trade tax increases partially offset 
these declines.   It is further interesting to note that only 68 countries showed increases 
in total tax yields.  While 91 countries increased their non-trade tax yields, in 23 of these 
cases (the partial replacement cases) it was not sufficient to offset the trade tax declines.  
Overall in 47 countries trade tax yield declines “contributed” to the overall decline of 
total tax yields, while a further 8 countries had total tax declines despite trade tax 
increases. 
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Number of 
countries
Change in 
Trade Tax 
Revenue 
over GDP 
over 25 years 
(%)
Number of 
countries
Change in 
Trade Tax 
Revenue 
over GDP 
over 25 
years (%)
Replacement 
rate = Increase 
in non-trade 
taxes 
offsetting 
decrease in 
trade taxes
Number of 
countries
Change in 
Tax 
Revenue 
over GDP 
over 25 
years (%)
Change in 
Trade Tax 
Revenue 
over GDP 
over 25 
years (%)
Contribution 
rate of trade 
tax increase  
to tax loss
Number of 
countries
Change in 
Tax 
Revenue 
over GDP 
over 25 
years (%)
Change in 
Trade Tax 
Revenue 
over GDP 
over 25 
years (%)
Trade tax 
contribution 
to tax 
increase (or 
reduction in 
tax loss)
High income, OECD
Sub-Saharan Africa
N. Africa & Mid East
Asia & Pacific 4 -0.9
Western Hemisphere 2 -0.7
Europe 15 -1.1 3 -3.3 -0.4 28%
Total 21 -1.0 3 -3.3 -0.4 28%
High income, non-OECD
Sub-Saharan Africa
N. Africa & Mid East 2 -0.3 41%
Asia & Pacific
Western Hemisphere 1 -1.8 1 -1.9 9%
Europe
Total 1 -1.8 3 -0.9 31%
Upper middle income
Sub-Saharan Africa 2 -2.4 1 -3.4 58% 1 -5.9 -4.6 78%
N. Africa & Mid East 1 -11.0 0.5 -4%
Asia & Pacific 1 -6.0 14%
Western Hemisphere 4 -3.4 5 -5.0 59% 4 -8.2 -0.6 26% 2 -4.6 0.6 -28%
Europe
Total 6 -3.1 7 -4.9 52% 5 -7.8 -1.4 36% 3 -6.7 0.6 -20%
Lower middle income
Sub-Saharan Africa 4 -4.5 1 -12.2 -6.0 49% 3 -2.9 0.6 -4%
N. Africa & Mid East 4 -3.2
Asia & Pacific 6 -4.7 1 -12.4 85% 2 -4.4 -1.1 26% 2 8.3 6.2 76%
Western Hemisphere 6 -1.8 2 -6.1 68% 1 -5.4 -4.8 89% 3 2.8 0.9 30%
Europe
Total 20 -3.5 3 -8.2 73% 4 -6.6 -3.2 47% 8 2.0 2.1 29%
Low income
Sub-Saharan Africa 3 -2.4 9 -7.2 53% 11 -11.9 -3.5 36% 7 3.1 2.4 67%
N. Africa & Mid East 2 -2.2
Asia & Pacific 1 -3.8 1 -1.6 49% 4 3.8 0.9 5%
Western Hemisphere 1 -6.4 -3.4 53%
Europe
Total 6 -2.6 10 -6.7 53% 12 -11.4 -3.5 37% 11 3.3 1.9 44%
All countries
Sub-Saharan Africa 9 -3.3 10 -6.8 53% 13 -11.4 -3.8 40% 10 1.3 1.9 45%
N. Africa & Mid East 6 -2.8 2 -0.3 41% 1 -11.0 0.5 -4%
Asia & Pacific 11 -3.3 3 -6.7 49% 2 -4.4 -1.1 26% 6 5.3 2.7 29%
Western Hemisphere 13 -2.1 8 -4.9 55% 6 -7.5 -1.8 41% 5 -0.2 0.8 7%
Europe 15 -1.1 3 -3.3 -0.4 28%
Total 54 -2.0 23 -5.6 52% 24 -8.4 -2.6 34% 22 1.5 1.8 30%
Income Class and 
region
Partial replacement
Table 4.  Distribution of countries across income groups and regions in terms of total and trade tax adjusment experience over 1975-2000
Trade tax decrease with non-trade tax replacement Trade tax decrease AND non-
trade tax decrease
Trade tax increase 
Complete replacement
                                                                  14
The reasons for these total tax declines can be various.  In some cases it is likely a policy 
choice was made to either downsize government or replace taxes with other sources of 
revenue, such as natural resource revenues.  These cases are likely amongst the high- 
income countries, and possibly many of the middle-income countries.  Amongst the low-
income countries, however, tax performances of a number of countries were clearly 
affected by varying degrees of severe civil disturbance, major regime changes and/or 
gross economic mismanagement.  Outside of these causes, then there remains the issue of 
to what extent many countries are constrained by structural features of their economies, 
such as large informal sectors, to be able to replace trade tax losses with domestic taxes.  
These issues of “tax capacity” limitations on low and also many middle-income 
economies are addressed in some detail in section 5. 
 
Are there any obvious trends in tax adjustment in moving from the high to low income 
groups of countries?   The high-income OECD countries at the one extreme have a fairly 
uniform experience with 21 countries displaying complete replacement as fairly modest 
reductions in trade tax yields of about 1% was more than replaced by large increases in 
non-tax revenues, but 3 countries (Iceland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) reduced 
their total tax yields along with trade tax yield reductions.  At the other extreme, low-
income countries displayed a wide range of tax adjustments.  Out of the 39 low-income 
countries, only 6 managed complete replacement, but a further 10 replaced 53% of the 
trade tax yield loss.   This performance is somewhat more optimistic than the B&K(2005) 
analysis would suggest, but still these 16 only represents 41% of these countries.7  A 
further 12 countries had losses in both trade tax and non-trade tax yields.  This group 
contains many of the economies subjected to severe disruptions noted above, but 
fortunately a number of these are now emerging with improved governance and 
economic management, and hence, are no doubt now on different tax adjustment paths.   
Finally, out of the 11 countries with trade tax yields increases, in 8 cases this contributed 
to increases in total tax and in the remaining 3 cases it offset total tax decreases.  Among 
the low-income group, therefore, 25 experienced trade tax yield declines, but only 14 
experienced total tax yield increases, and in 8 of these cases trade taxes were used to 
boost the total tax yield increases.  This suggests persistent difficulties in raising non-
trade tax yields among the 24 countries that showed increased non-trade tax yields, but 
with only 6 being sufficient to completely replace the lost trade tax revenues. 
 
The lower middle-income group displayed a relatively good adjustment performance with 
20 out of 35 countries (or 57%) showing complete replacement and a further 3 with 73% 
replacement of trade tax losses.  This is again somewhat better than expected from the 
B&K (2005) analysis based on their basic adjustment model.  B&K, however, did take 
their analysis a step further to recognize that countries may adjust differently to trade tax 
                                                 
7  Note that the B&K(2005) measure of  long-run tax adjustment in response to reductions in trade tax 
revenues holds the income and structure of the economy constant, and hence, removes the tax yield 
increases that would be gained from real economic growth and structural development of an economy.   As 
discussed in section 5, economic growth does not necessarily lead to higher tax yields (taxes as a share of 
GDP may remain constant or even decline), but if economic growth is accompanied by structural changes 
that enhance the tax capacity of a country (such as large formal sectors) as happens particularly with lower 
middle income countries, then non-trade tax yields can grow and offset trade tax cuts even without tax 
policy changes. 
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yield increases compared to decreases.  In the case of middle-income countries, when 
trade tax decreases were separated from increases, these countries managed almost 
exactly to replace trade tax yield decreases with non-trade tax yield increases. 
 
As noted above, there are major differences in trade and trade tax experiences of very 
small versus very large countries.   Focusing on the high trade tax yield cases, in Table 3, 
while their tax adjustment experiences were diverse, they managed to completely replace 
trade tax losses in 12 cases and partially replace them in a further 6 out of the 23 
countries with a higher share of the complete replacement cases among the higher income 
countries.  Total tax yields improved in 13 of these countries.  Overall this tax adjustment 
experience by the high trade tax yield countries, typically very small countries, is 
somewhat better than the overall sample.  At the other end of the spectrum, the very large 
countries (excluding the high-income OECD countries) such as China, India and 
Indonesia all had “abnormal” tax adjustment experiences over 1975-2000.  China and 
Indonesia (both LMICs) experienced reductions in both trade and non-trade tax yields.  
India, by contrast increased its trade tax yield that partially offset a decline in non-tax 
revenues. All 3 countries, therefore, experienced declines in total tax revenues.  These 
trends are no doubt reversed in more recent years as rapid economic growth is boosting 
domestic taxes in India and China.  These large country experiences clearly can dominate 
the weighted-average tax adjustment results and mask the experiences of smaller 
countries. Over issues are also raised later about the importance and changing roles of 
sub-national government revenues.  The central government revenues in these large 
economies may be giving an inaccurate view of the actual fiscal adjustment experiences.  
This topic is raised further in section 8. 
 
The disaggregated results of the individual country tax adjustment experiences over 
1975-2000 reveal a more complex experience than a simple trade-off between trade and 
non-trade taxes to maintain tax yields.  Interestingly, for some 44% of the countries in the 
sample their total tax yields were on a downward trend over 1975-2000, which is why the 
change in the country average total tax yield for all countries in Table 1 is negative.  By 
contrast, with tax yields for most of the high-income economies rising over the period, 
the change in the weighted average total tax yield was positive.  By disaggregating the 
country experiences, a somewhat improved adjustment performance by the lower income 
countries is revealed when this is not masked by some of the countries that are not on 
replacement trajectory.  It is still clear, however, that the problems of raising non-trade or 
domestic taxes rise as the income level of a country declines.  In addition, while most 
countries decreased their trade tax yields over this period, 18% of the countries in the 
sample increased their trade tax yields to boost overall tax revenues or offset non-trade 
tax declines.  The issues of the constraints on domestic revenues and how far and fast 
should low and middle income countries should go in lowering trade tax yields remains 
to be discussed.  Before tackling those topics, it is important to note some basic issues 
about the current nature of trade taxes. 
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4.  Trade taxes and trade liberalization strategies  
 
As mentioned above, many empirical analyses of trade taxes and models of the economic 
effects of trade taxes tend to reduce trade taxes into excessively simple measures that 
mask the underlying complexity of trade taxes and their effects on the economy.   When 
studying trade tax revenues, summary measures such as the trade tax yield (trade tax 
revenues over GDP) or the country tax rate (import duties over the value of imports) are 
often used.  Similarly, in modeling the economic effects of trade taxes and other indirect 
taxes, trade taxes are often represented by a single tax rate on some final imported good.   
In practice, the bulk of trade taxes typically arise from a complex import tariff schedule 
overlaid with complex exemption and bonding structures.  Many countries use about six 
thousand harmonized system codes to classify imports and apply a range of duty rates to 
these.  Imports are similarly a complex range of goods, often dominated by raw materials 
and intermediate inputs rather than some set of final consumption goods.   Hence, the 
same trade tax revenue yield can be collected from a variety of tariff schedules and be 
associated with a wide range of economic effects.  Indeed, it is not necessarily the case 
that a lower trade tax yield means a lower economic efficiency cost from trade taxes.  For 
example, a wider dispersion of trade tax rates typically leads to more costly economic 
distortions than if the rates are in a tighter band, and yet the revenue yields may be 
similar or even higher in the latter case.   
 
Table 5 illustrates the composition of imports in a selection of countries across income 
groups as well as regions and country sizes.  No clear pattern emerges, from these data 
given the wide range of industrial structures in the counties.  It is evident, however, that 
final consumption goods (which include consumer goods, food and beverage items 
primarily for households, passenger motor and non-industrial vehicles and automotive 
fuels) typically fall in the range of only 20% to 40% of imports.  In a few cases, often 
small economies, the consumption goods share is higher.  Countries with the highest 
consumption good shares in this selection include Iceland, St Lucia, St Kitts and Nevis, 
Jamaica, Maldives, Gambia and Suriname.  The large countries such as China, India and 
Indonesia all have low shares of consumption imports.   These results are fairly consistent 
with the observation above that most of the highest trade yield countries were small 
countries. 
 
Recognizing the complex natures of trade taxes and imports is important for two reasons.  
First, it is likely, and arguably efficient for many lower income countries to retain a 
certain level of trade taxes over the foreseeable future to sustain their revenues.  The 
reasons will be developed further below to the extent they are not already evident.  If this 
is the case, then it is important that they be charged in an economically efficient manner.  
Some of the recent trends that can be observed in the structure of import tariffs, however,  
are moving many low-income countries away from efficient import tariff structures.  
Second, as will be discussed later, the complexity of tariffs and composition of import 
trade are a contributing factor to the difficulties that the VAT has had in playing the role 
of a substitute source of revenue. 
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Country Consumption 
Capital equipment and 
parts
Raw materials and intermediate 
inputs
High income countries
Australia 27% 40% 33%
Austria 26% 37% 37%
Bahamas 39% 19% 42%
Bahrain 20% 12% 68%
Belgium 24% 25% 50%
Canada 21% 48% 31%
Germany 36% 32% 32%
Iceland 40% 35% 24%
United Kingdom 30% 37% 32%
USA 33% 36% 31%
Upper middle income countries
Argentina 20% 42% 38%
Botswana 31% 30% 38%
Belize 36% 27% 38%
Chile 25% 32% 43%
Malaysia 11% 63% 26%
Mauritius 33% 20% 47%
Saint Lucia 48% 22% 31%
Saint Kitts and Nevis 43% 24% 34%
Lower middle income countries
Bolivia 29% 35% 36%
China 7% 42% 51%
Indonesia 16% 28% 56%
Iran 9% 38% 53%
Jamaica 47% 19% 34%
Maldives 50% 21% 29%
Philippines 10% 52% 39%
South Africa 24% 36% 40%
Swaziland 38% 26% 36%
Thailand 9% 45% 46%
Low income countries
Bangladesh 13% 15% 72%
Gambia 58% 11% 31%
Ghana 25% 24% 51%
India 8% 17% 75%
Kenya 24% 26% 49%
Lesotho 35% 9% 56%
Malawi 20% 30% 50%
Senegal 28% 20% 52%
Suriname 40% 28% 32%
Uganda 39% 24% 37%
Source:  UN Comtrade Database
Import shares by broad classification of economic use in 2000
Table 5    Composition of imports by broad categories of economic use for a selection of countries in 
different income groups, 2000
Imports are grouped by Broad Economic Categories (BEC):  Consumption, BEC = 112, 122, 6, 7, 51, 522, 321, Capital equipment 
and parts , BEC = 4. 521, 53, and Raw materials and intermediate inputs, BEC = 111, 121, 2, 31, 322
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As is evident from results presented above (Tables 1 & 4 and in Appendices B and D), 
based on the observed declines in trade tax yields, trade liberalization has been 
widespread and persistent across most countries and regions.  As has been discussed 
extensively elsewhere, trade liberalization has been more than a lowering of duty rates.   
It has importantly included removal of quotas and foreign exchange allocation regimes in 
conjunction with relaxations of foreign exchange, capital market and domestic price 
controls.   The phenomenon of extremely high import duty rates is now more rare.  While 
this liberalization process had gone on in higher income countries over a number of 
decades, it was more concentrated in the late 1980s and 1990s in most of the developing 
countries.    
 
In the early stages, trade liberalization can lead to increased revenues as trade expands 
with freer access to foreign exchange, quotas are replaced by tariffs, and high duty rates 
are lowered, particularly where these rates were reduced from prohibitively high and 
often unenforceable levels.   In addition, many studies were conducted in the 1970s and 
1980s analyzing the complex and perverse incentive structures arising out of the 
cascading tariff structures.   In response, considerable emphasis was placed on moving 
tariff structures towards uniform tariff rates through radial compression of the import 
tariff schedules (essentially gradually raising the lower duty rates and lowering the higher 
ones towards some mid level rate, or at a minimum, two or three rates in a fairly tight rate 
band.)  Studies of the potential revenue and economic efficiency gains of radial 
compression were common and guidelines advocating the benefits of such policies were 
prepared.  See for example, Harberger (1988).8   It is useful to emphasize one of the 
critical benefits of radial compression.   While revenue and efficiency benefits can be 
gained from lowering high rates, the gains arising from raising duty rates on imported 
inputs were more critical.   Rate increases on imported inputs typically raise revenues and 
offset the subsidy effect in the output production and lowered the effective protection 
provided.   
 
Unfortunately, over the past decade trends in trade liberalization have dramatically 
departed from these principles in many countries under the pressures and procedures 
arising from establishing the many regional trading blocs arising around the world.   
While average tariff rates are lower, a trend towards high effective rates of protection has 
remerged.   This is evident at least in the Sub-Saharan African region from the author’s 
experiences. 
 
As part of trade liberalization and attempts to create larger and more efficient markets, 
there has been a proliferation of regional trading blocs, most with some medium term 
goal of establishing regional customs unions or common markets.  Ultimately these 
trading blocs would establish a common external tariff (CET) for their region, and all 
trade within their region would no longer be treated as international trade for customs 
purposes – no import duties would be charged on trade between member states, but also 
no export incentives would apply to such trade.  The sequence of policy changes that has 
                                                 
8   Arnold C. Harberger, Trade Policy and the Real Exchange Rate, Economic Development Institute, 
World Bank (March 1988). 
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been undertaken in establishing these regional trading blocs has typically been slow and 
involved lowering importing duties on trade between member states before establishing a 
CET and removing favorable treatment of exports.  This sequencing has been the case in 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) and the East Africa Community (EAC) over the past 
decade or so.  Under the Cross Border Initiative (CBI) donor agencies provided aid 
incentives to accelerate the reduction in duty rates on trade between member states.  By 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, internal tariff rates had been lowered significantly 
between COMESA members, and SADC arrangements are similarly now underway with 
a target of eliminating import duties on trade between member states substantially by 
2008 and completely by 2012.   
 
The goal of establishing a common market with a CET is to promote trade and 
investment in the region, with investment incentives largely neutral within the region, at 
least in terms of effective rates of protection.  Unfortunately, over recent years the 
sequencing of liberalization has led to perverse investment incentives.   Aside from the 
issue of different tariff schedules among member countries providing different effective 
rates of protection, the continued eligibility of exporters within the region for export 
incentives made it more attractive to move investment to a neighboring country to supply 
a domestic market.  For example, a domestic producer in one country could be paying 
duty on imported raw materials, but a producer in a neighboring country under various 
export platform provisions may get duty free raw materials (whether operating out of an 
export processing zone or receiving duty exemptions or drawbacks on imported raw 
materials used to supply the exports) and then export into the country without any tariff 
barrier.  Without a CET and allowing preferential export treatment within the region, 
domestic firms have effectively been faced by unfair import competition from within the 
region.  As a result they put pressure on their own governments to remove this distorted 
situation.  Without the power to effect the regional structure individually, member 
countries have taken the only other alternative, namely to lower the duty rates on the 
imported inputs of affected industries, thereby putting them back on a level playing field 
with the export competition from within the region but effectively increasing the effective 
rates of protection within the region and at the same time forgoing import duties. 
 
Kenya can be used as a case study of how dramatic these effects can be arising from the 
unfortunate sequencing of trade policy changes on the import revenues and trade 
distortions of the country.  For about a decade prior to 1997/98, Kenya had been 
implementing a program of trade liberalization, including market liberalization, radial 
compression of import tariff rates and major strengthening of customs administration.  
These are detailed in Glenday (2002) and Glenday and Ryan (2003).9   Effectively Kenya 
                                                 
9  Glenday, Graham “Trade Liberalization and Customs Revenues: Does trade liberalization lead to lower 
customs revenues?  The Case of Kenya,”  Journal of African Finance and Economic Development , 
Autumn 2002, 5(2), 89-125; Glenday, Graham  and T.C.I. Ryan “Trade Liberalization and Growth in 
Kenya,” in Restarting and Sustaining Economic Growth in Africa: the Case of Kenya, edited by  M. S. 
Kimenyi, J.M. Mbaku, and N. Mwaniki, Contemporary Perspectives on Developing Societies (Ashgate 
2003) Chap 5 
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had managed by the mid-1990s to more than halve its effective import duty rates, but 
double its import duty revenue yield.  In 1997/98, Kenya was planning a further step in 
import tariff rate compression to bring its top rate down from 35% to 25%.  At the same 
time, however, political pressures from manufacturers that were becoming increasingly 
exposed to competition from within the COMESA region were escalating.  In fact, Egypt 
had joined COMESA and had a similar mix of manufacturers to Kenya a well as many of 
them operating out of export processing zones.  Kenyan manufacturers effectively 
recaptured the political initiative by demanding and gaining increased trade protection.  
While the overall rate schedule was adjusted downwards as planned, local industry was 
awarded a series of temporary additional duties on competing imports and, more 
importantly, Kenya started a series of cuts in the tariffs on the imported inputs of 
manufacturers that continued for a number of years.  These raw material and intermediate 
input values formed high shares of the total imports, and hence, were costly in terms of 
both revenues and economic distortion costs.  By 2000/01 the cumulative effect of these 
duty cuts resulted in the standard VAT rate having to be raised from 15% to 18%, a major 
rate increase to offset the trade tax revenue losses that were not generating efficiency 
gains, but, in fact, were moving in the opposite direction of the Harberger-style proposals 
of trade tariff compression of a more than a decade earlier.    
 
Similarly, policies of low or no tariffs on imported inputs – capital goods, raw materials 
and intermediates – of the major domestic industries have emerged in many Sub-Saharan 
African countries which are faced by these internal distortions within the trading blocs as 
they are being constructed.  These low rates have become the starting point for 
negotiating a CET.  Interestingly, Uganda during the 1990s was convinced of the merits 
of a uniform tariff structure, but it appears that this goal maybe lost in the process of 
establishing a CET with EAC and/or COMESA.  COMESA is still struggling to establish 
a CET (as are the EAC and SADC).  To date, the only part of this CET that COMESA 
has agreed to is duty rates in the 0% to 5% for capital equipment and raw materials.  The 
rate structure for intermediate and final goods is not agreed.  Indeed, the detailed 
classification of specific goods to these broad categories will cause problems in 
negotiations of a CET given different industrial structures and different interests in 
protecting the existing structures.  For example, a country with a pulp and paper 
production industry will regard paper and board as a finished product whereas other 
countries will see them as intermediates.   
 
The formation of trading blocs can result in trade tax revenues being lost as the trade 
barriers between countries drop. This occurs both through trade diversion as regional 
production displaces dutiable imports from outside the region, and, as discussed above, 
further through the pressures to move away from radial compression of duty rates, 
particularly the large losses from lowering duties on imports of major industrial inputs.  
Table 5 above shows the importance of capital, raw material and intermediate inputs in 
the typical import composition of low and middle-income countries.   There is a clear 
agenda here to reform the policy sequencing of the formation of trading blocs as well as 
to re-establish the policy goal that more uniform tariff structures are more efficient in 
collecting revenues and less distortionary.   
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5.  Limits on tax capacity in low-income countries 
 
The size of government (or total government expenditures as a share of the economy) is a 
matter of public choice, but this choice is constrained particularly for lower income 
countries by the characteristics of an economy that affect the feasibility and costs of 
raising sustainable revenues to finance government operations.  Certain features of an 
economy make for more or less cost-effective revenue raising efforts.   
 
Features that have low administrative and compliance costs of revenue collection are 
typically referred to as “tax handles.”  Good tax handles include imports forming a high 
share of the economy, most imports entering through well-controlled sea, air or rail ports, 
large formal sector mining operations, and a large share of business activities being 
conducted in large formal sector corporations.  By contrast, other features of an economy 
can make for difficult tax collections.  These include a large non-monetary or subsidence 
agriculture sector, a large informal or micro-business sector with poor books and records, 
a weak accounting profession, and low levels of literacy and numeracy which undermine 
the ability of the private sector to self-assess taxes such as income tax or VAT.  These 
types of structural characteristics affect the “tax capacity” of a country or the feasibility 
of a country to administer different types of tax. 
 
Historically, all countries' tax systems were limited to the feasible tax handles, typically 
taxing trade at ports and city gates, or taxing specific types of domestic production – the 
origins of “customs and excise.”  As discussed in section 3 above, the twentieth century 
saw the emergence of the broad-based taxes in the high-income OECD countries that 
generated the revenues currently observed in these countries.  The growth in revenue 
yields of the public sector that resulted in these countries now averaging around 45% of 
GDP (with a spread of about 10 percentage points around this mean) depended upon two 
key structural features developing in these economies.  First, the growth in labor income 
in terms of both the wage rates earned and the number of workers earning high enough 
amounts to justify taxing increasingly high shares from their income.  Second, the 
emergence of companies offering formal employment arrangements and maintaining 
accounts in a way that the efficient payroll deduction and PAYE systems became feasible 
for most workers.  These deductions at source from payrolls now form the backbone of 
revenue collections.  Formal business entities also allowed the corporate income tax, the 
broad-based sales tax, and later the VAT to be implemented.  Most developing and 
emerging economies have inherited or adopted these broad based taxes, but the 
underlying structural features of these economies only allow these taxes to apply in 
limited parts of their economies.   For low-income countries the choice of a government 
collecting 50% of GDP in revenues, for example, is not an option.  Hence, exploring the 
nature of these constraints is important. 
 
The impact of the structural features on the tax capacity of a country shows up strongly 
when the level and composition of central government revenues are compared across 
different groupings of countries at different per capita income levels.  Table 6 gives the 
level and composition of central government revenues from the World Bank World 
                                                                  22
Development Indicators (WDI) for 1997 or 1998 for groupings of countries according to 
per capita income.10  These results show that overall central current revenues rise from 
the low-income group at 13.4% of GDP to the high-income group at 28.4% of GDP (and 
36.9% of GDP among the European Monetary Union countries) in 1997-98.  Tax on 
international trade at 25.8% of current revenues is important among low-income 
countries, but is negligibly small among high-income countries.  Taxes on goods and 
services are important among all country groupings.  Taxes on income, and especially 
social security taxes (which are generally payroll or employment taxes), however, rise 
sharply from the low-income countries to the high-income countries.  Combined income 
and social security taxes form only about 20% of current revenues among low-income 
countries, but rise to nearly 50% among high-income countries and about 64% among the 
European Monetary Union countries.   
 
These patterns reflect both the need for low-income countries to rely on tax handles (such 
as border collections on trade) and the difficulties of collecting direct taxes that require 
both formal business accounting practices and income levels of individuals to be high 
enough above some minimum threshold to be subject to tax.   Low-income countries are 
often characterized by factors that make the collection of tax infeasible, expensive and/or 
unproductive.  These include:  
 
(i) significant non-monetary sectors (or subsistence agricultural sectors);  
(ii) a large share of the economic activity in the agricultural sector resulting in 
widely dispersed business activity with much of it conducted by small scale 
farmers with poor books and records;  
(iii) large numbers of informal businesses in small scale agriculture, manufacturing, 
trade and services that mainly operate without books and records;  
(iv) large unskilled labor force with wages levels that are largely income-tax exempt 
or only in falling in the lowest tax brackets;  
(v) weak accounting standards and relative few professional accountants to 
maintain books and records for tax purposes; and  
(vi) low educational attainment or relatively high illiteracy rates that make 
compliance with self-assessed taxes such as the income tax or VAT difficult 
 
                                                 
10 Note that the shares of current revenue for different groupings of countries as reported in the WDI 
database do not necessarily add up to 100 per cent, particularly in the low income and lower middle income 
groups because of missing data and weighting problems in aggregating the data.  As a result, adjustments 
have been made to the shares of revenue by source to scale them such that they add up to one hundred 
percent. 
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Even in a low-income country, however, there may be some tax handles that raise its 
revenue raising potential such as a relatively large volume of imports flowing through a 
well-managed port, or large mining operations of multinational corporations that are 
make significant profits and export their product in a controlled fashion.  As per capita 
incomes grow in most economies, however, many of the adverse factors on tax 
administration and compliance decline and at the same time the share of workers with 
higher and taxable incomes grows.  Growth in per capita income and income taxes on this 
income has proved to be the major source of revenue across countries.  
 
While central government tax revenues from indirect consumption taxes grow from 
around 4% of GDP to a range of 9% to12% of GDP moving from low to high-income 
countries in Table 6, tax revenues from the income taxes (including social security taxes) 
rise rapidly across the income levels of countries:  low, 3%; lower middle, 5%; upper 
middle, 9%, and high, 14% of GDP.  Amongst the high-income countries, income and 
social security taxes are 16% of GDP for OECD countries, and 23% of GDP for the 
 
Table 6.   Level and composition of central government revenues by country groups, 
1997-8 
     Shares of current revenue 
Country Group Year    
Current 
revenue as 
share of GDP
Tax 
revenue 
as share 
of GDP 
Tax 
revenue 
Taxes 
on 
trade 
Taxes on 
goods 
and 
services 
Taxes on 
income, 
profits, 
etc 
Social 
security 
taxes 
Other 
taxes 
Non-tax 
revenue 
   Percentages 
Low income 1998 As reported 13.4 11.0 82.2 20.9 27.9 16.2 0.0 1.5 13.2 
Lower middle 
income 1998 As reported 18.5 16.0 86.6 9.7 36.6 19.5 4.0 2.6 13.6 
Low income 1998 Adjusted/a 13.4 11.0 82.2 25.8 34.5 20.1 0.0 1.9 17.8 
Lower middle 
income 1998 Adjusted/a 18.5 16.0 86.6 11.6 43.7 23.3 4.7 3.2 13.4 
Upper middle 
income 1997 As reported 19.9 17.7 88.9 4.3 39.5 16.2 28.2 3.6 10.5 
High income 1997 As reported 28.4 25.9 91.2 0.04 27.3 28.6 19.7 15.5 8.6 
High income OECD 1997 As reported 28.4 26.0 91.6 0.003 26.6 29.8 25.0 10.2 7.3 
European Monetary 
Union 1997 As reported 36.9 33.6 91.1 0.0 26.0 29.7 33.4 2.0 6.4 
World Development Indicators 2004; author calculations 
a.  Note that the shares of current revenue for different groupings of countries as reported in the WDI database do not necessarily add up to 
100 per cent, particularly in the low income and lower middle income groups because of missing data and weighting problems in aggregating 
the data.  As a result, adjustments have been made to the shares of revenue by source to scale them such that they add up to 100%..
                                                                  24
European Monetary Union Countries.  At all levels of government, OECD countries 
averaged some 26% of GDP in direct income and social security taxes in 1995.11   
 
Structural features constrain the ability of low-income countries to collect taxes on 
income, but as income levels grow the structure of the economy changes.  Importantly, 
the middle class becomes an increasingly large share of the economy so that in the 
middle-income countries, income taxes, particularly payroll-based taxes, become more 
feasible for more persons and the base grows rapidly as individuals both become taxable 
and move up into higher tax brackets.  At higher per capita income levels, choice over the 
size and role of government becomes possible rather than the constraints on revenue 
collections limiting the target yield for taxes.   In addition, once top tax rates have been 
set, tax revenues as a share of the economy are limited by these rate choices and will 
approach maximum yields as the efficiency of any tax rises (or the share of the economy 
subject to these maximum rates approaches its maximum potential.)   By contrast, among 
low-income countries it is more typically the size and nature of the informal sector that 
constrains tax yields. 
 
The informal sector forms a major constraint on tax capacity because it contains the non-
monetary sector of an economy as well as those smaller producers and traders conducting 
unincorporated business activities with no or very incomplete business books and 
records.  Informality at one extreme could arise from lack of literacy and numeracy, or 
from a lack of specific training in business management practices – generally, the sector 
lacks the capacity to comply with modern taxes.  Typically, the scale of business activity 
may be such that they fall under the minimum turnover level of a sales or VAT and/or 
below the minimum income at which income tax would be charged.  Such businesses 
with a lack of compliance capacity should be distinguished from small and micro-
businesses, which are capable of tax compliance, but fall below the taxable limits.  They 
should also be distinguished from the capable businesses that partially or completely fail 
to document their business activities and go unrecorded in direct statistical measures of 
economic activity or are unreported in any tax assessment.  These are the underground 
parts of the economy – capable, but evasive.  The shadow economy includes all these 
parts that fail to register, report or comply.  It is the non-monetary and the small and 
incapable parts of the business sector that represent the real constraint on taxation.  Often 
informal business activity is recognized statistically as partly rural, small-scale farmers 
and informal farm workers, and partly as urban informal businesses largely in trading, 
personal and businesses services and small-scale manufacturing, often with no permanent 
business premises. 
 
The non-monetary sector in an economy is typically characterized by subsistence 
agriculture and self-supplied housing.   In low-income economies such as Malawi, 
Tanzania and Kenya, these are estimated to be significant shares of GDP, and hence, 
raise issues of comparability of tax capacity across countries.   Malawi national accounts 
report the self-consumed production of smallholder farmers as an estimate of the non-
monetary sector valued in GDP.  Between 1994 and 2003, the non-monetary sector in 
                                                 
11  Vito Tanzi and Ludger Schuknecht, Public Spending in the 20th Century: A Global 
Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 
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Malawi is reported by the National Statistical Office to have grown from 18.5% to 27.4% 
of GDP as the relative size of the smallholder-farming sector has grown.  National 
accounts reported by the Central Bank of Tanzania show the non-monetary agricultural 
sector at 30% of GDP at factor costs in 1986, then falling to 26.1% in 1990 and rising 
again to 29.9% by 1999.   In Kenya, the non-monetary sector over the past decade has 
typically been reported at close to 5.5% of GDP.  Unfortunately, not all low-income 
countries estimate and report the share of the non-monetary sector.  Ideally, a measure of 
the size of the non-monetary sector included in the GDP in each country would be an 
important variable to explain tax capacity through cross-country comparisons of its 
impact on tax yields.   
 
Few countries are able to report the size of the informal labor force, whether in the rural 
or urban sectors.  Kenya, for example, does report some estimates that are suggestive of 
the importance of the informal sector in the economy as a limiting factor on taxation.  
The Economic Survey reports that out of a population of 32.2 million in 2003, only 1.8 
million are employed in the modern or formal sector and a further 5.5 million are 
employed in the non-agricultural informal sector.  Based on WDI(2005) labor force 
estimates, then this leaves some 9.3 million working in monetary or non-monetary 
agricultural activities.  Compared with a decade ago, the modern sector employment has 
grown by only 17% whereas the non-agricultural informal employment has grown 
by 85%,12 and the agricultural informal workers by 18%.  Clearly, these data point to a 
shift of workers into the non-agricultural, urban informal activities.  Clearly, a major 
problem remains for growth in direct taxes based on deductions out of wage income.  
Again, estimates of the size of informal employment, whether in the agricultural or other 
sectors are not typically available for cross-country comparisons.   
 
Tax capacity studies as a result have typically resorted to using the share of the 
agricultural sector (and it is assumed that countries are providing these data inclusive of 
estimates of non-monetary sector activities, whether explicitly noted or not) as both an 
estimate of the taxing problems in that sector as well as a proxy for the relative size of the 
overall informal sector.  As the Kenya data point out, where the non-agricultural informal 
sector is growing rapidly it may be underestimating the structural problem.  
 
Estimating tax capacity 
In this study, an extended version of the B&K (2005) database is used to check the 
importance of some of the structural variables or tax handles on the tax capacity of 
countries.  These estimates are described and presented in Appendix E.  Here the focus is 
on the results of the estimates.   The estimates are made on the full sample of 123 
countries (see Table E.1) where dummy variables are used to check whether structural 
features have a different impact on tax capacity amongst different income groups.  For 
example, the implication of a larger agricultural sector in a low-income country is 
expected to be more constraining on tax collections than having a larger agricultural 
sector in a high-income country.  In the former, it would likely indicate more smallholder 
farmers, whereas in the latter farmers may be large corporate farmers capable of 
                                                 
12 There is also some evidence the per capita income of the non-agricultural informal sector has dropped in 
real terms limiting somewhat the growth in the share of value-added attributed to this sector. 
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complying with taxes.  In addition, the estimates are repeated on the lower income (low- 
and lower middle-income) country data to check the estimates identified by dummy 
variables from the full database.  These results appear in Table E.2. 
 
The estimated impact of the share of GDP involved in the agricultural sector is as 
expected.  Based on all countries, an increase of one percent of the economy involved in 
agriculture reduces the tax yield amongst lower income countries by about 0.2% or a 
coefficient of -0.2.  The impact on higher income countries is more unstable, ranging 
from a negative impact of 0.1% to a positive impact of 0.3%.   Based on the lower 
income countries, the same result is obtained for low-income countries of a drop of 0.2% 
per 1% increase in the agricultural sector share.  The lower middle-income countries 
show a weaker response of about 0.12% drop in tax yield for a 1% increase in the 
agricultural sector share.  These results are consistent with other studies.  Glenday (2005) 
estimated  –0.3 for the countries in the Southern African Development Community based 
on 1990-2001 data;  Katusiime (2003) estimated a coefficient of –0. 2 for East African 
countries over 1991-98 and Stotsky et al (1997)13 estimated –0.17 for Sub-Saharan 
African countries over 1990-95.   Amongst lower income countries, the size of the 
agricultural sector averaged 28% over 1975-2000 with a standard deviation of 14%.  
With a coefficient of -0.2, an increase in 28 percentage points in the agricultural sector 
share implies a drop in tax yield of 5.6 percentage points – a large difference in tax 
capacity. 
 
Another feature of an economy of particular interest in this study is the impact of goods 
imports as a share of GDP on tax capacity.  Based on the data for all countries, the lower 
income countries show an increase of about 0.15 percentage points in tax yield per one 
percentage point increase in imports as a share of GDP.  The effect of an increase of 
imports on higher income countries is in the range of -.05 to 0.06.  Based on the sample 
of lower income countries alone, for low-income countries a tax yield increase of 0.2 is 
expected and for lower middle-income countries, 0.15 is expected.  This is somewhat 
higher than estimates by Glenday (2005) for the SADC countries of 0.02 to 0.07; Stotsky 
et (1997) reported similarly low results for Sub-Saharan Africa and Katusiime (2003) 
reported 0.126 for East African countries.  These studies cover more recent time periods 
during which trade liberalization reforms where being more actively followed, and hence, 
the use of import taxes was more policy constrained.  In fact, if the interaction between 
the year and imports as share of GDP is introduced for low-income countries, it is found 
that the effect of imports on tax yield declined by 0.0025 per year, which would imply 
that the impact of imports over the 26-year period would have dropped by 0.065.  Hence, 
the current impact of imports on tax capacity is lower, possibly nearer 0.1, because 
average import duty rates are now lower.   
 
Other results of interest are a significant positive impact of the mining sector of about 0.1 
per percentage points of tax yield per one percentage point increase in the mining share 
of GDP.  This impact jumps to about 0.25 when grants and other non-tax revenues are 
included.  These other revenues tend to substitute for taxes and may also contain non-tax 
                                                 
13 Janet G. Stotsky and Asegedech WoldeMariam, “Tax Effort in Sub-Saharan Africa”  IMF Working 
Paper (WP/97/107) September 1997 
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mining revenues.  This result is consistent with the findings by Glenday (2005) for SADC 
over 1990-01 where the coefficient on mining fell in the range of 0.2 to 0.3. Mining 
sector share data was available for about 60% of the country-years in the sample. 
 
Another important variable is the impact of grants and non-tax revenue on the tax yield of 
a country.  It is well known that many oil rich and mining dominated countries are under 
utilizing their domestic tax bases.  Hence, it is important to control for the non-tax 
revenues as a share of GDP in estimating tax capacity.  Similarly, countries receiving 
significant grants from donor countries as a share of GDP are expected to partially 
substitute grants for tax burdens on their populations.  Unfortunately, only data on the 
combined amount of grants and other non-tax revenue was readily available from 
WDI(2005) to extend the B&K data sample, and then only for about 20% of the sample 
years.  When the combined effect of mining and non-tax revenues was estimated, the data 
was only jointly available in about 10% of the country-years.  Nevertheless, the estimates 
on these reduced samples are consistent with expectations.  For all the countries, a one 
percentage point increase in grants and other revenues as a share of GDP is estimated to 
reduce the tax yield by 0.15 to 0.5 percentage points.  In the sample of lower income 
countries, the coefficients were in the range of -0.22 and -0.43.   Glenday (2005) 
estimated the impact of grants on SADC tax yields in the range of -0.19 to -0.54, and the 
impact of non-tax revenues in the range of -0.29 to -0.55.  Katusiime (2003) estimated the 
effect of non-tax revenue on tax yields in the study of East African countries at -0.32.    
These substitution effects are reconsidered below when a more complete set of the 
potential fiscal adjustments in response to a cut in trade tax yields are discussed in section 
8. 
 
Finally, the impact of per capita income is largely as expected.  For the full sample of 
countries, tax yields rise with per capita GDP, but at a declining rate.  In fact, the results 
show the tax yield peaking at about $31,000 per capita (2000 US$).  This is consistent 
with the observation of some of the highest income countries having tax yields below the 
highest observed tax yields.  Interestingly, based on the estimates for the lower income 
countries, tax yields rise at an increasing rate after about $2,200 per capita.  This is 
can be explained as about the income level at which the middle-class taxpaying 
population starts playing an increasingly important role in direct tax payments.   
This is an important turning point for a country.  It appears to indicate the income point at 
which the direct tax yield starts growing with the increasing importance of the middle 
class.  Care has to be taken, however, not to extrapolate beyond the income range of these 
lower middle-income groups, as it is clear that the tax contribution eventually grows at a 
declining rate as per capita income grows in the high-income country range.14 
 
Informal sector and VAT inefficiency 
One immediate fallout of having a large informal sector is on the effective domestic tax 
base.  The limitations were illustrated for the case of direct income taxes on labor income 
as in the case of Kenya with a very small share of employment in the formal sector.  The 
impacts can more readily be approximated for the VAT given its simpler tax structure.   
The effective tax base for the VAT can be calculated if it is assumed that all the VAT 
                                                 
14 Lower middle-income group has per capita GNI in 2003 US dollar of between $765 and $3,035. 
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revenues have been collected at the standard rate (which is typically close to being true 
for most broad-based VATs.)   This effective base can then be compared to various 
national aggregates to test the “efficiency” of the VAT:  comparisons are typically made 
with GDP, total consumption, private consumption, and total consumption reduced by the 
government wage bill (which is part of government consumption not subject to the VAT.)   
The last measure is the closest crude measure to the potential base of a consumption 
VAT.   The actual legislated potential VAT base requires considerable detailed analysis 
to add back the increase in the base caused by final taxes being collected on inputs in 
exempt businesses, but otherwise adjusting the base downwards for various exempt 
sectors or zero rated parts of domestic demand.  This would include the effects of small 
businesses with turnover levels below the minimum turnover level not having to register.  
The larger the informal sector in an economy, the larger is the reduction in the legislated 
potential VAT base.  This legislated base will be smaller than the crude potential base 
(such as consumption in the economy reduced by the government wage bill), but will 
exceed the effective base by the inefficiencies arising from weak administration, poor 
compliance and tax evasion.  For example if the potential base is 80% of GDP, but the 
legislated base through excluding small business (including the informal sector) and 
exempting various sectors reduces it to 50%, but the effective base is only 35% of GDP, 
then the gross inefficiency is the gap between 80% and 35% or 45% of GDP.  If the 
maximum possible base for the legislated structure is 50% of GDP, then the gap caused 
by weak administration and compliance is 15% of GDP.  The VAT efficiency in terms of 
adjusted consumption of 80% is expressed as 35%/80% = 48% and, in terms of the 
maximum legislated base, is 35%/50% = 70%.  Here we will look at the gross VAT 
inefficiency and not attempt to explain the share of the gap that is closed by legislated 
exemptions and zero ratings, but illustrate that this gap is large and tends to be highest 
amongst the low-income countries with large informal sectors (which get excluded out of 
the typical VAT base through these firms being too small to be required to register.)  
 
Table 7 illustrates estimates of efficiency for VAT or sales tax for a sample of individual 
countries, here the member states of SADC.  The average for these countries in terms of 
GDP is 29%, consumption is 34%, consumption less government wages is 38%, and 
private consumption is 44%.  Table 8 gives regional averages for GDP-VAT and private 
consumption-VAT efficiencies.  The SADC estimates are slightly higher, but generally 
consistent with the regional averages for Sub-Saharan Africa.15 
  
                                                 
15   In the case of Tanzania over 1997-2001, there is a gross tax gap of about 68% of GDP between the 
potential VAT base of 84% of GDP and the effective base of 16% of GDP.   Here the effects of a large 
informal sector (including a non-monetary sector of 30% of GDP) explain about two thirds of the gross tax 
gap.  Tax structure choices and weak administration and compliance explain the remainder. 
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It is clear from these data that the gap between the potential tax base and the effective one 
is large for low-income countries, typically greater than 60% of GDP.   This gap can be 
closed by a series of different actions or economic changes: 
 
a. Policy and legislative changes that expand the base by removing discretionary 
exemptions or rate rebates, within the bounds of what is feasible in terms of 
administration and compliance given the structural features of the economy. 
Table 7.  Average VAT/sales tax efficiency, SADC Member 
States, 1997-2001 
Percentages 
 VAT efficiency relative to    
  GDP C C-gov wages C private 
Angola 21.0 36.7   
Botswana 17.7 29.6 35.0 57.0 
DRC 3.2 4.0 4.1 4.6 
Lesotho 44.8 36.0 41.6 46.2 
Malawi 26.7 27.1 28.8 31.6 
Mauritius 38.0 49.5 54.9 59.9 
Mozambique 29.3 32.4 34.9 36.6 
Namibia 46.2 51.0 62.6 75.5 
South Africa 41.6 50.3 53.1 65.5 
Swaziland 26.4 27.6 32.3 35.7 
Tanzania 16.2 16.2 16.9 17.5 
Zambia 31.3 33.3 35.6 39.0 
Zimbabwe 37.8 43.8 50.5 55.7 
Average 29 34 38 44 
Source: Glenday (2005), Table 6.6 
Table 8.   VAT efficiency by region 
Percentage 
 VAT efficiency relative to   
Region GDP Cprivate  
Sub-Saharan Africa 27 38  
Asia and Pacific 35 58  
Americas 37 57  
European Union (including Norway and Switzerland) 38 64  
Central Europe, Russia, Baltic and Other States 36 62  
North Africa and Middle East 37 57  
Small Islands 48 83  
 Source:  IMF Staff estimates, The Modern VAT (2001) Table 4.1   
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b. Structural changes in the economy through growth and development that 
expand the legally taxable tax base and expand the options for legal expansion 
of the base – such as increasing numbers of large formal businesses, higher 
literacy and improved business skill levels, etc. 
c. More efficient administration of the existing tax laws, particularly taxpayer 
education and service, and removal of tax policies that induce tax evasion 
such as excessively high rates or penalties. 
 
Actions under the first and last options can be taken in the short-term.   Ultimately, 
however, the structural constraints limit what policy and administration can achieve. 
 
An important implication or corollary of these structural features and resultant low VAT 
efficiencies of low-income economies is that for large segments of the population most 
basic needs fall outside of a VAT base – these include unprocessed food, water, shelter, 
primary health care and education.  This leaves the VAT or sales tax falling mainly on 
discretionary or luxury goods.  In turn, this results in the price responsiveness of the tax 
base being higher than would happen if a larger share of consumption were covered.  
Hence, the VAT is doubly constrained for low-income countries.  Not only is the base 
effectively narrow, but it is also more price responsive than for higher income countries.   
This limits the ability to raise the standard tax rate much above 20%.  These 
considerations will be expanded upon in discussing the limits of VAT to replace trade tax 
revenues. 
 
 
6.  Limits on VAT as revenue substitute for trade tax revenue 
 
It is not surprising that the consumption VAT is commonly seen as the obvious substitute 
for trade tax revenue losses at least over the medium term.16  Low-income countries rely 
heavily on indirect taxes on international and domestic trade for at least 50% of revenues.  
Aside from excise duties, a VAT or Goods and Services Tax usually represent the largest 
indirect tax base available in an economy.  See Table 6 above.    
 
Another argument often put forward is that import duties only tax imports, whereas a 
consumption VAT taxes both imports and the domestically supplied portion of total 
consumption.   Therefore, the higher the share of consumption supplied domestically, the 
larger the VAT base is relative to imports.  Final consumption in most economies usually 
exceeds imports of goods by a wide margin. This means that either more revenues can be 
raised at the same rate, or the same revenues can be raised at a lower rate than with 
import duties.  At the same time, the tax distortion on the domestic supply side caused by 
the effective protection provided by import duties is removed.  In addition, the VAT falls 
on the taxable non-tradables produced and consumed in the economy.  This logic of VAT 
having the larger base holds to the extent that import duties fall on the same final 
consumption base of households and government and inputs of exempt businesses 
                                                 
16 See for example, Liam Ebrill, Michael Keen, Jean Paul Bodin and Victoria Summers, The Modern VAT, 
International Monetary Fund (2001) 
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and non-governmental organizations as the VAT.   As noted above from Table 5, 
however, imports in most counties are composed largely of capital equipment, raw 
materials and intermediate inputs.  This means that most of the VAT charged on such 
imports would result in input VAT deductions or credits.  When import duties are 
removed from items that would be deductible inputs under the VAT, then for the VAT to 
make up the trade tax losses, the VAT rates have to be increased on the effective VAT 
consumption base with the related market-squeezing revenue losses and efficiency 
costs.17  (To some extent some of the import duty losses on inputs will be recaptured 
through higher income taxes on the wider profit margins of domestic businesses.)   
 
How easy it is to make up these lost trade tax revenues when a large share of the tariff 
reductions are on raw materials, intermediates and capital goods depends on (a) the 
relative size of the domestic VAT base and (b) how high the VAT rates already are when 
import duty rate cuts are implemented.  In section 5 above, it was illustrated that for low- 
and middle-income countries that the effective VAT base is typically in the range of 20% 
to 40% of GDP.  This is about the same range in which imports as a share of GDP are 
found for the same economies.  Appendix C shows the sample average import share for 
the 123 countries in the B&K (2005) database was 32.8% with a standard deviation of 
27.5% of GDP.  The effective sizes of the VAT and import bases are likely to be similar 
in many countries, but in some cases the effective import base may be larger because the 
structure of the economy demands high import shares and/or the inefficiency with which 
the VAT base is administered lowers the effective VAT base.  If the VAT base is 
effectively only a third of GDP, then to make up a one percent of GDP loss in import 
duties will require at least a three percentage point increase in the standard VAT rate.  
How much higher will depend on the share of final VAT consumption goods in imports, 
the changes in the import tariff (duty rate cuts on consumption goods versus inputs), and 
the existing VAT rates.   The higher the VAT rates already being charged, the more 
                                                 
17 When import tariffs are lowered on final consumption goods in a price-taking economy, the revenues can be 
replaced by VAT rate increases that leave the domestic demand prices for these goods at the same or lower prices given 
that the VAT has a larger base of the total domestic demand for these final consumption goods and not just the share of 
demand satisfied through imports.  This price effect, however, is also affected by the impact of tax changes on tradable 
goods on the exchange rate.  Cutting the import tariff increases import demand for foreign exchange.  This depreciates 
the exchange rate, somewhat offsetting the direct price decrease caused by the import tariff cut.  The increased demand 
for foreign exchange is also dampened somewhat through the decreased import demand for traded inputs into the 
domestic production of the final consumption goods that decreases as its protection is reduced.  Increasing the VAT 
rate, however, also decreases demand, including import demand that, in turn, appreciates the exchange rate offsetting 
most of the depreciation caused by the import tariff cut.   Overall the exchange rate is left almost unchanged.  This 
allows the VAT to replace the import duty on consumption goods without a demand price increase. 
 
When import tariffs are lowered on intermediates, the prices of tradable final consumption goods remain unchanged as 
they are fixed by world prices, except if the exchange rate is affected.  Lowering import tariffs on intermediates 
increases import demand for these goods that depreciates the exchange rate.  The import demand for foreign exchange 
will be somewhat offset by increased down stream domestic production of goods using the cheaper intermediates and 
decreased demand for upstream inputs into the production of the intermediates now receiving lower protection.  The 
domestic prices of final consumption goods in the VAT bases rise slightly as the exchange rate depreciates.  The use of 
VAT rate increases to offset the import duty revenue loss will result in offsetting decreases in import and foreign 
exchange demand.  This offsets the depreciation, but overall the prices of final consumption goods rise with the VAT 
increase bringing into play the demand responsiveness of the effective VAT base.   
 
Exchange rate depreciation also attracts resources out of the non-tradable into the tradable sector.  This will result in 
some increase in non-tradable prices, which also limits the room for VAT rate increases. 
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difficult it becomes to extract added taxes out of the base as the effective demand for 
taxable goods both because of market substitution and because of increased incentives to 
evade the tax. 
 
As discussed in section 5, low effective VAT efficiencies tend to make the VAT more 
price responsive than would otherwise be expected from a broad based tax.   This limits 
the ability to raise the VAT rate, especially if the rate is already reasonably high.   Often 
this argument may be taken as merely speculative, but at least one country has run a real 
experiment that illustrates the point.   Malawi has a “surtax” which was originally 
administered as a general sales tax and then in 1987 converted to the credit method used 
by the VAT.  Over the period from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, Malawi raised its surtax 
standard rate from 20% up to about 35% over a number of years and then lowered back 
to 20% over a few years.  Even with is large change in the standard rate, the tax yield 
only varied by about 1% of GDP.  This result is consistent with a high price 
responsiveness of the effective VAT base.   The details were presented in an earlier study 
by Glenday (2005), but are repeated for convenience here in Appendix F.   This is a very 
sobering illustration of the limitations of the VAT as a revenue raiser to replace trade tax 
losses if it is already being used heavily as a source of revenues.18 
 
For many countries, VAT has already been heavily exploited.  Indeed it was often 
introduced to replace existing broad-based sales taxes or turnover taxes that already had 
significant revenue yields.  The VAT in these cases was introduced to gain from its 
potentially broader and less distortionary base (particularly in its ability to handle the 
service sector) and for its improved enforcement features.  For many low- and middle-
income economies a key feature was its taxation of all imports such that it was more 
difficult for the unregistered small businesses to escape involvement in the tax, at least on 
their inputs, if not on their outputs. 
 
In a recent study of the implementation of VAT in the SADC region, Glenday (2005) 
found that of the eleven countries that had implemented VAT, only one, Mauritius could 
be argued to be using it to replace import duty revenues.  All the other countries replaced 
sales or turnover taxes.   Mauritius introduced a sales tax in 1983 at a rate of 5%.   
Through 1991, trade tax revenues remained in the range of 10.4% to 11.3% of GDP.  
After 1991, trade taxes dropped consistently through the 1990s to about 5.5% of GDP by 
1999.  At the same time total indirect taxes dropped from 14.5% to a low of 9.8% of GDP 
in 1996.  To counter this, the sales tax rate was raised to 8% in 1996, and then a VAT 
was introduced in 1998 at 12% followed by a further rate increase to 15% in 2003.  By 
2000, total indirect taxes had recovered to 12.3% of GDP.  First the sales tax, and then 
VAT were used to offset the revenue losses of lower trade taxes.  This scenario was 
clearly possible because there was considerable room to raise the standard rate from 5% 
starting in 1996 to its current level of 15%.  By contrast many low- and middle-income 
countries already have standard VAT rates in the range of 15% to 20%, and hence have 
minimal upside room for increased revenue yields through rate increases.  Countries that 
                                                 
18 Another example can be taken from Kenya when it raised its standard VAT rate from 15% to 18% in 
response to cuts in import duties, particularly on imported inputs, as discussed in section 4.  The revenue 
yield was consistent with a high demand price elasticity of at least –1.3. 
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still have modest VAT or general sales tax rates – in the 5% to 10% range such as 
Botswana – still have some room to enhance their tax yields through rate increases.  
Clearly, more efficient and effective administration can increase yields in all cases.  In 
addition, the gradual structural changes that come with economic growth also bring 
higher numbers of larger businesses into the indirect domestic tax net and enhance 
revenue yields as a share of GDP.19  
 
 
7.  Efficient trade taxes and tax alternatives 
 
From discussion above, it should be clear that lower income countries (low and lower 
middle-income countries) have constraints on their ability to raise non-trade taxes 
(whether direct or indirect taxes) from the domestic economy to replace trade taxes as 
revenue source.  It was also observed that in many regions countries had reverted to using 
trade tax regimes more as protective devices than as revenue raisers.  Hence, there is 
considerable scope to reduce the allocative efficiency costs of trade taxes through moving 
back towards more uniform tariff schedules while sustaining or possibly even increasing 
revenues. 
 
To consider more carefully the issue of the efficient paths that lower income countries 
should follow to improve the efficiency of their tax regimes, it is necessary to layout the 
range of efficiency costs that need to be considered.  In the post World War II period, the 
focus in tax design fell on reducing the allocative efficiency costs.  This was with good 
reason.  The tax system had begun to be used extensively as a tool in income 
redistribution and sector incentives.  Top marginal tax rates in the income tax often were 
over 50% and as high as 90%.   The income tax contained a wide range of investment and 
other incentives.  Selective high tax rates were common in sales tax and excise duty 
schedules targeting luxury goods.  Import tariffs offered cascading tariff schedules with 
high top tariff rates often in excess of 100%.  Hence, the price incentive effects on supply 
and demand-sides were enormous and concern about the allocative efficiency costs 
became dominant.  The economic tools for measuring these economic costs also emerged 
through work by Harberger and others.   
 
Tax reforms starting in the 1970s started to focus on reducing and rationalizing tax rates.  
An “industry” to calculate the effective marginal tax rates on investments emerged to 
back up these reforms.  These reform efforts started in the OECD countries, particularly 
the UK, and gradually spread to the developing world reaching Indonesia already by the 
early 1980s.  By the late 1990s, tax rate structures internationally, with few exceptions, 
had been substantially lowered and rationalized.  This clearly lowered the resource 
allocation costs of taxes, and focus has gradually shifted and widened to recognize the 
importance of the other economic efficiency costs of taxes: (a) the resource costs incurred 
by governments through tax administration, and (b) the hidden resource costs of tax 
                                                 
19 It is important to note that with ad valorem tax rates, it is not the growth per se that increases the tax 
yield, but the increase in the tax base as a share of GDP (a structural change) that increases the tax revenue 
as a share of GDP.  If the tax base grows at the same rate as GDP, then the tax yield from an ad valorem tax 
rate remains constant. 
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compliance borne by the taxpayer.  Unfortunately, nowhere near the same attention has 
been paid to the theory or empirical estimation of these economic transaction costs, 
particularly in the context of developing countries.  In addition, more attention has 
focused on tax administration than compliance costs because of the difficulty of 
estimating these latter costs, and then only in OECD countries.  See, for example, Tran-
Nam et al (2000) study in Australia.  By contrast, there is a growing recognition that the 
presence of large informal sectors in developing countries makes a difference to which 
taxes necessarily have the lowest efficiency costs.  Studies such as Emran and Stiglitz 
(2005) have developed the theoretical framework to show that it is possible in countries 
with large informal sectors present that trade taxes can be more efficient than 
consumption taxes.   These conclusions are achieved without consideration of the 
differentials in the administrative and compliance costs between tax structures that would 
typically strengthen their results. 
 
What are the key concepts in tax theory that can help lead to efficient taxation of the low-
income country economies with large informal sectors?  Seeking ways to minimize the 
allocative efficiency costs of taxation has been the focus of optimal tax theory.  This 
started with advocacy of uniform tax of goods in a first best world, but has long 
recognized that once not all goods are taxable, such as “leisure” or non-labor market time 
and products, then differential taxation can lead to efficiency improvements.  Some 
combination of the following considerations typically form part of the policy mix 
improving the allocative efficiency of a tax system in a second best world: 
 
a. Close substitutes for untaxed goods should be taxed at lower rates20 
b. Complements to untaxed or even subsidized or protected goods should be 
taxed at higher rates.  Complements could be inputs into production of 
untaxed, protected or subsidized goods. 
c. Higher tax rates should be applied to inelastically demanded goods or 
inelastically supplied factors of production. 
d. All close substitutes in production or consumption should be taxed at similar 
rates 
 
It is important to recognize that only one of these rules concerns the efficiency loss in the 
own market of a taxed good – that is rule “c” – otherwise these rules focus on the cross-
price effects between markets or the indirect effects of taxing inputs rather than outputs.  
Typically tax reform is implemented in a more or less incremental fashion adjusting tax 
structures.  To the extent economic allocation costs of taxation are considered, these four 
considerations typically enter the analysis to remove at least the more extreme cases of 
efficiency costs.  Hence, if these rules are applied to consideration of taxation of the 
informal sector, where would they direct tax designers?   
 
                                                 
20  Lowering the tax rate on a close substitute limits the shifting of demand towards the untaxed good.  
Raising tax rates on compliments to an untaxed or subsidized good reduces the demand for or production of 
untaxed or subsidized goods.  Radial compression of import tariffs, for example, includes raising the duty 
rates on inputs into the production of protected products to limit the domestic supply distortion. 
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The informal sector, as discussed above, is typically isolated from modern taxation by 
high administrative and compliance costs.  It is most inaccessible to direct taxes such as 
the income tax, and next to indirect taxes such as the VAT, both which require more 
sophisticated record keeping.  Another critical consideration would also be the nature of 
the outputs of the informal sector – to what extents are they close substitutes for the 
formal sector?  The more informal outputs are substitutes in consumption for those of the 
formal sector, then higher tax rates in the formal sector will clearly drive more consumers 
and business activity into the informal sector.  The more differentiated the outputs 
between the sectors, the weaker this effect.  Local knowledge is needed as to how 
differentiated these markets are.  The more overlap that exists in a country, however, the 
greater the tax problem for raising tax rates on the formal sector.   
 
What are feasible ways or taxing the informal sector?  What is the mix of efficiency 
considerations for each?  There are three tax structures that can play roles in taxing the 
informal sector efficiently:  (i) VAT (or general sales tax); (ii) import duties, and (iii) 
presumptive taxes on informal sector traders.   
 
i. VAT:  The VAT effectively taxes the informal sector as it is an exempt sector and 
inputs into the exempt businesses form a final tax base for the VAT.  Hence, 
whether the informal sector is trading in imported or domestically produced final 
goods, or it is using capital or current inputs in its own production of goods or 
services, the VAT on inputs from imports or from the domestic formal sector will 
effectively tax the goods and services produced and/or purchased from the 
informal sector.  To the extent that inputs are derived from other exempt sectors, 
possibly the farm sector, this effect is diluted.   
 
There are two major constraints on how far the VAT can be pushed in taxing the 
informal sector through its inputs.  The one is the substitution effect mentioned 
above.  As the VAT rate gets raised on formal sector products, it is possible that 
consumers switch to the informal sector and the effective VAT base gets 
squeezed.  The other is that the a VAT rate discourages traders from registering 
for VAT as their turnover gets close to or above the minimum turnover limit for 
compulsory registration.  In markets where small traders are typically less 
sophisticated, the VAT already presents two kinds of compliance costs.  First, 
registration for VAT may represent a major upfront, commencement or fixed cost:  
the weaker the accounting capacity and tax knowledge of the trader up front, the 
larger the cost of registering for VAT and setting up the accounting systems and 
acquiring the basic knowledge of the tax system.  This cost may eliminate the 
expected profits of business expansion.  In this situation, the higher the VAT rate, 
then the smaller the margin on turnover expansion becomes.  The second, but 
likely smaller compliance cost would be the recurrent costs of complying with the 
routine VAT filings.  Hence, if a higher VAT rate squeezes the margins that can 
be gained from higher turnovers, then traders will become even more reluctant to 
absorb the compliance costs of registration and will take evasive and or avoidance 
actions (such business splitting).  By contrast, failure to register saves the 
administrative costs of processing new small returns.  In summary, the VAT 
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creates potentially significant price differentials between the formal and informal 
sectors that can adversely affect its yield and economic efficiency costs. 
 
ii. Import duty:  Import duties, broad based, such as a uniform tariff, and falling on 
the inputs into the informal sector also effectively tax the informal sector through 
raising its input costs.  Import duties differ from a VAT, however, in two 
significant ways.  First, uniform import duties will be more neutral across the 
informal-formal sector boundary as the output prices of both sectors should be 
increased by the same amounts if it is a uniform tariff and as long as there is no 
major difference in the intensity of importables in the costs of the two sectors.  
Second, a uniform import tariff has very low compliance and administrative costs 
as long as customs operations continue for other indirect taxes as well as for 
safety, health, environmental and security reasons.  Put another way, there is little 
cost gain from eliminating the payment of an import duty if customs still has to 
enforce VAT, excise duties, etc on imports as well as other its other border 
control functions.  It is extremely important to note that for an import duty to have 
a predictable impact on the informal sector it will need to be close to a uniform 
tariff (and certainly including the importable inputs into the informal sector), 
otherwise it may have no effective tax effect while still having the well known 
subsidy effects on domestic producers.   As noted above, many current import 
tariffs have moved to virtually eliminate duties on raw materials and capital 
equipment, which removes some of the input tax effect on the informal sector 
from the import tariff. 
 
iii. Presumptive taxes on small-scale traders.  If a tax can be charged on an 
otherwise untaxed sector, then there are possibly efficiency gains (rather than 
costs) associated with this tax.  This comes about because of the substitution 
effects with the already taxed sectors.  If a turnover tax, for example, can be 
imposed on the informal sector, then if this causes consumers to switch back to 
the taxed formal sector, then there can be an expansion in taxes in the formal 
sector that outweighs the efficiency costs caused directly in the informal sector 
market by the turnover tax. The closer the outputs of the two markets are as 
substitutes, the bigger the gain of raising tax rates in the informal sector.  This is 
another way of saying close substitutes should be taxed at the same rate (see rule 
“d” above.)   This result has been recognized by some analysts.  For example, 
Warlters and Auriol (2005) estimate that the gain from taxing the informal sector 
in Sub-Saharan Africa would justify an administrative and compliance cost of 
13% of revenues.21  While this seems to provide a wide margin for administrative 
and compliance costs, these costs may well form an even higher share of 
revenues.  The costs of collection of small amounts of revenue across large 
numbers of small taxpayers can be high.  By its nature, the informal sector is also 
not suited to the self-assessment styles of tax administration, more common under 
                                                 
21 Warlters and Auriol only recognize administrative costs, omitting compliance costs, and attribute the 
average administrative cost to the imposition of a tax on the informal sector rather than the marginal cost of 
the particular tax.  In the case of any tax on the informal sector administrative costs as share of revenues are 
likely to be higher than the average for all taxes. 
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the income tax or VAT, where information-rich tax returns are backed up by 
selective random inspections.  A presumptive tax will typically need to be more 
“low tech,” to have simple, low-cost compliance, but also be more labor intensive 
from the tax administration side.  Tax administrators will need to be on the 
ground more frequently to identify the business activity of informal traders.  The 
search for such an efficient presumptive tax system remains a key, but an under 
exploited tax base in low-income country tax systems.  It is revisited below.   
 
Here, it is important to point out that the size of the presumptive tax and its 
efficiency effects have to be considered in conjunction with the VAT so that the 
effective tax rate is considered as the combined effect of both the VAT on inputs 
into the informal sector and the presumptive tax on its outputs.22  (The import 
duty impacts affect both formal and informal sectors on their outputs and inputs in 
a similar fashion.) 
 
Given the different allocative, administrative and compliance costs of these three 
different approaches, some combination of these three taxes may form the optimal mix.  
The stronger the substitution effect between the formal and informal sectors, the more 
likely that a uniform import tariff will play a positive role, and the more likely that 
raising the standard VAT rate will have adverse effects.  The larger the size of the 
informal sector and the stronger the substitution effects, the greater the efficiency gains 
from a presumptive tax structure that can keep its administrative and compliance costs 
low. 
 
Other unusual economic structures may also lead to “non-standard” “optimal taxes.”   As 
noted above small countries, often islands have the highest trade tax yields.  If customs 
can be efficiently operated and domestic economic activity is concentrated in a hard to 
tax service sector such as tourism activities, then concentrating tax collections at the 
border may be the most efficient tax structure. 
 
 
8. Alternative fiscal adjustment channels 
 
One of the core findings that this study is responding to is the difficulty of lower income 
countries to replace trade taxes with non-trade taxes in the course of implementing trade 
liberalization policies.   This study has already noted the constraints on the broad-based 
income tax and VAT in lower income countries, but there are possible ways of using 
import duties more efficiently and seeking to gain greater revenues directly from the 
difficult-to-tax informal sector.  Here these various options are not just summarized, but 
also put into the larger context of the fiscal choices countries face in financing the public 
sector.  The choices are wider than merely the trade-off between central government trade 
and non-trade taxes.  B&K (2005) note two such directions – one is the choice of size of 
                                                 
22 For example, if α = share of inputs paying VAT at rate, v, and t = presumptive tax rate, then for the 
combined effect of the presumptive tax plus input VAT to be approximately equal to the output VAT, αv + 
t(1+αv) = v, or t = v(1-α)/(1+αv).  If v=15%, α = 70%, then t =4.1%.   
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government, and the other is the issue of changing revenue responsibilities between 
levels of government in a country – but do not expand upon these.  This study will take 
some steps down these two roads, but not very far.  It will also bring out the issues of 
non-tax revenues and grants, and sub-national revenues and their consequences for the 
tax choices.  Finally, it will comment on the obvious choice of investment in more 
efficient tax administration as a global path to solving fiscal pressures, including tax gaps 
and aid dependency.  Accordingly, this section will address some brief comments to the 
following six fiscal adjustment paths.   
 
a. Role of import taxes 
b. Taxing informal sector businesses  --  potential strategies 
c. Aid and non-tax revenues 
d. Sub-national revenues  
e. Size of government and role of the voluntary sector or non-governmental 
organizations 
f. Tax administration improvements 
 
 
a.  Role of import duties 
 
From the above analysis, it is clear that the trade tax yield has been declining for most 
countries internationally in recent decades (1975-2000) in line with expectations of trade 
liberalization efforts, but still, out of 74 lower income countries, 19 had trade tax yield 
increases.  While upper income countries generally managed to increase total tax yields, 
and consequently completely replace trade tax losses, amongst the lower income 
countries far fewer saw rising total tax revenues.  Of the 74 lower income countries, 40 
had rising tax yields and of these only 26 had rising tax yields completely offsetting the 
trade tax losses.  Given 34 countries with tax yield declines over the period, it leaves 
questions about whether other revenue sources were displacing central government taxes 
or were these countries voluntarily downsizing government? 
 
Despite the declines in trade tax yields, trade taxes remained an important source of 
revenue in 2000.  For the average country, the trade tax yield was 3.7% of GDP, but 
when weighted by GDP it dropped to 2.8% for low-income countries (LIC) and 1.2% for 
lower middle-income countries (LMIC).  As a share of tax revenues, it was 25% for the 
average LIC, and 21% for the average LMIC, and when weighted by GDP, these average 
shares changed to 28% for LIC and 8% for LMIC.  The impact of having small countries 
making heavier use of trade taxes is important in interpreting these results where trade 
taxes may yield 6% or more of GDP and more than 50% of tax revenues.  Overall, trade 
taxes will remain important especially amongst the LIC and amongst the small, typically 
island economies.  It has been noted that a uniform import tariff can improve efficiency 
through it indirectly taxing the informal sector, which tends to be most important 
amongst the LICs.  At the margin, given that a customs administration is required to 
enforce any VAT, sales, turnover or excise tax, the incremental administrative and 
compliance costs are low.    
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Import tariffs on average are low internationally, but are not necessarily well structured 
from an economic efficiency perspective.  They may need to be restructured again to 
achieve greater uniformity in order to be able to lay any claims to import duties making 
an efficient contribution to tax revenues.  The proliferation of trading blocs across the 
world appears, at least in the case of those in southern and eastern Africa, to be setting up 
incentives for countries to lower tariff rates on capital goods, raw materials and 
intermediates not produced in the region.  Moreover, these rate structures can be expected 
to persist in the common external tariffs (CET) that these free trade areas, customs unions 
or common markets will eventually have to implement.  Reversing this situation will take 
significant coordinated policy changes and may be harder once a CET is in place given 
that it then becomes a multi-country decision for a trading bloc. 
 
 
b.  Taxing the informal business sector – potential strategies 
  
The informal sectors, particularly the more urban-based petty traders, manufacturers and 
service providers, appear to be growing rapidly, if data from Kenya is representative.  
The informal sector is the major constraint on implementing broad-based income taxes 
and VAT, and yet is generally not being effectively taxed.   Most countries have some 
sorts of taxes on small-scale business activity, typically through some form of business 
licensing or possibly a turnover tax.  Typically, however these taxes are not well 
structured, not well coordinated with the larger domestic taxes (income tax and VAT), 
and not efficiently administered.  At the same time, many central government tax 
administrations in lower income countries are recognizing the inefficiencies in trying to 
collect tax from dispersed small-scale businesses and are raising minimum turnover 
levels for the VAT.  Some countries are simultaneously, however, trying to implement 
more or less well-coordinated presumptive taxes for the businesses below the VAT 
turnover limit for compulsory registration and/or below the minimum level for paying 
personal income tax.   There is a growing desire to have some unified presumptive tax to 
capture revenues from the large number of small businesses.   Many countries are 
searching for an appropriate structure.  Glenday (2005) reviews the developments in the 
SADC region which include: Mozambique using a turnover tax for a layer of small 
business below the minimum turnover level for the regular VAT, and Tanzania using a 
turnover tax as part of the income tax for low turnover businesses.  These structures are 
administered centrally.  They are also limited to businesses where a turnover level can be 
assessed.  Unit or annual fixed sum taxes are typically required to obtain broader 
coverage from businesses that do not issue invoices or keep books.  The turnover taxes 
contrast with the Single Business Permit system administered by local authorities in 
Kenya where unit taxes per business are charged on all business activities with the rates 
scaled to the size of the local market and the size of different types of business as 
measured by some physical criteria such as number of beds in a hotel.  This system 
utilizes the simple local registration and compliance mechanisms in conjunction with the 
lower labor costs and local knowledge of local authorities.  Local authorities are typically 
involved in land use management, property taxes, market management, and other 
property-related services or regulation that already gives them knowledge of the business 
activities in their jurisdiction.  If the tax covers all businesses, it also does not need to 
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draw a dividing line between large and small business.  With unit taxes per business, the 
effective tax rate drops off for the larger businesses that also pay central government 
VAT and income taxes.  Locally administered taxes also have the merit of promoting 
local political accountability.  Local taxes can also often be placed on otherwise 
politically unacceptable sectors such as agricultural products given the revenues benefit 
the local residents.  The Kenyan system, however, would benefit from central oversight 
and greater co-ordination with central taxpayer identification and registration.  For very 
small countries, central administration of presumptive taxes may remain efficient, but for 
larger countries this is unlikely to be the case. 
 
A significant agenda remains in studying the size and nature of the informal sector as 
well as designing cost-effective presumptive income taxes that utilize the strengths of 
local governments and central tax agencies in a coordinated fashion.  The system should 
also incorporate ways of training businesses in accounts and the issuing of invoices and 
graduating them to the VAT and income tax in a smooth fashion.       
 
 
c.  Aid and non-tax revenues 
 
While tax revenues on average form the bulk of central government revenues, non-tax 
revenues are a significant revenue source.  As Table 6 shows non-tax revenues range 
from about 7% of the revenues of high income countries up to 18% for low-income 
countries.   Non-tax revenues, however, are more concentrated among the oil and other 
mineral rich countries.  How countries chose to take natural resource revenues between 
tax and non-tax revenues vary based on the tax and national ownership structures.    
Hence, not surprisingly, significant substitution is expected between non-tax and tax 
revenues.  Unfortunately, the B&K(2005) data set does not include non-tax revenue 
information, and the data base also does not contain some of the resource-rich countries.   
A combination of grant and non-tax revenues were added for about 20% of the sample, 
but with more time the data could be filled out from the financial records of most 
countries. It is of interest to verify how countries have varied the use of non-tax revenues 
over time and whether they have been used as a substitute for trade taxes.  
 
Grants from foreign donors form another important source of revenues for low-income 
countries.  Grants to LICs are often in the 1% to 3% of GDP range.  These amounts are 
similar in magnitude to the trade taxes.  Grants are of interest here for a number of 
reasons.  First, grants often substitute for revenue effort as the tax capacity estimates 
above show.  An added dollar of grants substitutes for 0.2 to about 0.5 of a dollar of 
taxes.  This means that some of the tax capacity of countries is suppressed, but 
fortunately that means that the tax effort of countries can be increased to replace grants, 
which can be expected to decline over time as countries develop or aid gets withdrawn 
for other reasons.  Second, it is important to note the magnitude of grants is similar to that 
of trade taxes – the potential future loss of grant revenue faces countries with a revenue 
challenge of similar magnitude to a loss of trade taxes through trade liberalization.  Third, 
trade liberalization has often been a policy condition for the receipt of program aid, 
sometimes substituting for forgone trade tax revenues at least in the short term.  Further 
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study of the role of aid in trade liberalization and financing government operations is 
advisable. 
 
 
 d.  Sub-national revenues 
 
Revenues are collected by national and sub-national governments in a country depending 
on how revenue sources are assigned across levels of government.  There is incomplete 
data available internationally and considerable variations in cross-country experience, but 
some trends have been observed.  Based on GFS data for 1980-98, sub-national revenues 
trended upwards from 17% to 25% of total revenues.23  High-income countries tend to 
have higher shares of revenue at the sub-national level at about 20% than low-income 
countries at about 9% in 1998.  Large countries also tend to have higher shares collected 
at the sub national level.  For example, India had about 34% collected at the sub-national 
level 1998, and sub-national levels in China collected about 59% of revenues in 2001 
(including shares of the VAT and income tax revenues).  Among the high-income OECD 
countries there is enormous variation in the revenue collections from a low of 4% of total 
revenues in Greece up to 40% in Canada in 1998.  Clearly, with the variation across 
countries in the degree of decentralization and apparent growing trend towards 
decentralization, the interpretation of central government revenues could be significantly 
affected by these variations.   This also impacts dramatically the discussion of the total 
tax or revenue yield in the large countries which otherwise appear to be operating much 
smaller governments if only central revenues are considered than they are if revenues 
from all levels are included. 
 
 
e.  Size of government and role of voluntary sector 
 
As B&K (2005) point out, governments may choose or be constrained to smaller sizes as 
a share of GDP as trade tax yields fall.  As discussed above, 34 out of 74 lower income 
countries had declining tax revenues over 1975-2000.  As Table 1 shows that while high-
income OECD countries had increases in the tax yields, low-income countries (LIC) on 
average had decreases in tax yields.  While the average tax yield is fairly low for LIC at 
13% appearing to leave limited room for revenue cuts to be absorbed through downsizing 
government, there is considerable variation in yields with some LIC with tax yields over 
20%.  Interestingly, as the tax capacity estimates also show that countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa tend to higher tax yields than the average of the other countries in the same 
income groups by about 6 to 7 percentage points, while those in Asia and the Pacific are 
only one to two percentage points above.  This opens the question about whether some of 
the high tax yield countries should preferably adjust to trade liberalization through down 
sizing government rather than by imposing added non-trade taxes. 
 
                                                 
23 Estimates of the share of sub-national revenues in total revenues are based on IMF GFS country data, 
1998, by Robert Ebrel, Workshop on Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in East Asia World Bank Institute, 
Indonesia, 2002 
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As an aside comment, different countries promote varying roles for non-government 
organizations in delivering public services.  This is, in part, a national choice on the 
organization of the public service delivery in a country and, in part, a result of private and 
official donor choices on how to channel funds to a country.  These choices are more 
difficult to measure, but no doubt also impact choices about the size of government. 
 
 
f.  Tax administration improvements 
 
As discussed for the VAT above, taxes under perform in lower income countries falling 
short of the potential tax bases by some 60%.  Most of this short-fall can be attributed to 
structural features such as large informal sectors that will require long-term development 
efforts to overcome, but at the same time there remains a considerable gap between the 
legislated potential taxes bases, which typically exclude the hard-to-tax sectors, and the 
effective base that can be closed through more active tax administration efforts and 
upgrades.  These include more effective identification and registration of taxpayers, 
better taxpayer education and services, making filing and payment of taxes less 
burdensome, efficient audit selection, competent and effective audits, control of 
corruption, reasonable and enforced penalties, training prosecutors and taxpayers, and 
using specialized tax courts to resolve tax disputes, efficient debt collection of tax arrears, 
expanded use of computerization and e-governance techniques, efficient functional 
organization, costing of tax administration functions and collection costs, and on-going 
and expanded training efforts, amongst others.  Many tax agencies are aiming at best 
practices in many of these areas, but few have achieved best practice in most areas.  
There remains massive scope for technical assistance, institutional development and 
training to support improved tax administration.  
 
 
9.  Recommendations 
 
Arising out of this study are some clear policy and research agendas both to improve the 
interrelationship between trade liberalization and tax revenues and to enhance the 
understanding of how to achieve more cost-effective tax administration and compliance: 
 
Encourage moves towards more uniform import duty rate structures through a 
return to radial compression of tariff rates.  This will require a review of the strategies 
that are being followed by various groups of countries to form free trade areas, customs 
unions or common markets (or all three in sequence) to encourage a more rapid 
movement towards establishing the institutional mechanisms to formulate and sustain 
CETs.  In addition, member states of these trading blocs should be encouraged to 
mutually agree to remove all export platform treatments of exports within a trading bloc.  
This second policy is critical to achieving agreement on a more efficient and uniform 
CET.  There is also need to gather the information on the current tariff schedules that are 
evolving in the new trading blocs to confirm the direction that they are in fact taking and 
assess potential adverse impacts on revenues and allocative efficiency. 
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Introduce or enhance informal sector taxation:  Efforts are needed to assess the size, 
nature and growth of informal sectors and devise efficient strategies for the imposition of 
presumptive income taxes, including the potential role of local authorities in 
administering these taxes and the co-ordination of the administration of such taxes with 
central agencies.  While the importance of the role of the informal sector is gaining 
growing recognition in tax policy, information on the sector is poor.  A focus on the 
employment numbers and earnings in the agricultural and non-agricultural sector 
components is required through labor force and/or household income and expenditure 
surveys. 
 
Need for focus on theory and estimation of administration and compliance costs: 
Tax compliance and administration costs are re-emerging as having significant efficiency 
considerations, but there is weak information, especially for lower income countries on 
estimates of average and marginal tax compliance and administration costs.  Estimates 
are required of the fixed entry costs of different taxpayers registering and developing the 
compliance capacity for different tax types as well as the recurrent costs of compliance.   
The interactions between administration costs and compliance costs needs to be 
understood – by how much do tax education and services lower compliance costs?  
Elements of this work should overlap with the study of the design of taxes for informal 
sectors. 
 
Multiple fiscal adjustment channels:  Broader understanding is required of the fiscal 
adjustment channels different countries are using to accommodate trade liberalization 
revenue losses. The analysis needs to recognize the roles of non-tax revenues, grants and 
sub-national revenues, in particular. 
 
Tax data improvements:  There is need to build on the excellent data set constructed by 
B&K (2005).  Clearly considerable careful work is required to construct reasonably 
accurate and consistent data.  Appendix A notes more specific issues, especially in 
improving VAT data.  Useful additions would be to fill out the full picture of sources of 
revenue:  add non-tax revenue (particularly, noting where it is derived from natural 
resources), grants received by governments, separating export taxes from other trade 
taxes (especially noting where they are derived from mineral exploitation), and where 
feasible, sub-national revenues, both tax and non-tax.   The issue of sub-national revenue 
is particularly important for the large countries such as China and India with large 
provincial and state governments.   In addition, expansion of the database to cover Russia 
and the transitional countries, even if for more limited time periods, is needed to improve 
the coverage of the database. 
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Appendix A 
 
Characteristics of trade tax sample 
 
The data used in the study is based on the data sample used by B&K (2005).  The 125 
countries included in the sample are given in Table A.2 grouped by income class and 
region.   Five income classes are recognized according World Bank Development 
Indicators classifications:  low, lower middle, upper middle and high income,24 with high 
income countries divided between OECD and non-OECD countries.  The high-income 
OECD countries are also referred to industrial countries. The regions recognized are Sub-
Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, Western 
Hemisphere, and Europe. 
 
In this study 123 countries are included.  Brunei and Myanmar are dropped because some 
basic economic indicators are not readily available.  Table A.1 shows the break down of 
the sample population by income class and compares it with the full sample of all 
countries in terms of the number of countries included, the share of GDP (measured in 
US dollars in 2000) and the share of the populations in 2000.    
 
 
 
                                                 
24 The classification of countries follows the World Bank classification based on per capita GNI in 2003 US 
dollars:  low income countries , $765 or less; lower middle income, between $765 and $3,035; upper 
middle income, between $3,036 and $9,385; and high income, $9,386 and above 
 
Panel A Sample Countries
Income class of 
country Number 
% of all 
countries Population, 2000
% of all 
countries GDP, US$, 2000
% of all 
countries
Low income 39(40) 64% 1,819,273,000 84% 740,288,230,826 89%
Lower middle income 35 63% 2,020,935,200 78% 2,145,466,878,000 64%
Upper middle income 21 57% 124,037,990 39% 775,456,980,000 43%
High income non-OECD 4(5) 13% 7,183,000 22% 141,350,700,000 24%
High income OECD 24 100% 898,996,100 100% 24,520,588,700,000 100%
Total 123 59% 4,870,425,290 81% 28,323,151,488,826 91%
Panel B All Countries
Income class of 
country Number 
Relative 
share (%) Population, 2000
Relative 
share (%) GDP, US$, 2000
Relative 
share (%)
Low income 61 29% 2,161,090,860 36% 835,540,993,315 3%
Lower middle income 56 27% 2,588,696,810 43% 3,358,498,206,000 11%
Upper middle income 37 18% 321,818,850 5% 1,787,063,840,000 6%
High income non-OECD 30 14% 32,884,890 1% 598,324,090,000 2%
High income OECD 24 12% 898,996,100 15% 24,520,588,700,000 79%
Total 208 100% 6,003,487,510 100% 31,100,015,829,315 100%
Table A. 1   Representation of sample countries of all countries by number, population and 
GDP in US$ in 2000
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The sample of countries includes 59% of all countries, 81% of the world population, and 
91% of the world GDP.   The sample includes the two most populous countries, China 
and India, and all the high-income OECD or industrial countries, which account for 79% 
of GDP measured in US dollars in 2000 even though they only contain 15% of the world 
population.  The main grouping of countries excluded from the sample is the transitional 
or former socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia as well as Russia.  This 
results in lower representation in the upper middle-income group.  For these transitional 
economies there are problems both with getting data for 1975-2000, and because of the 
major shifts in economic policy that have occurred starting in the 1990s.  In addition, 
there is low representation in the high-income non-OECD group, but this is largely 
formed of many small economies, which only constitute about 1% of the world 
population and about 2% of the world GDP.   Overall, the sample of countries can be 
taken as sufficiently representative to draw conclusions about major trends in trade and 
overall taxation across countries. 
 
Data adjustments and issues 
 
As B&K note in their study, this data draws heavily upon the country reports on the 
economic performance of countries including the reports on the financial operations of 
the government as this data is available for a wider selection of countries and years than 
the tax collection data provided in the Government Finance Statistics.   Even so there are 
still often difficulties in interpreting country tax and other revenue data to be sure of the 
correct classification.  This often requires detailed local knowledge of the tax structures 
of countries to be aware of some of these issues. 
 
One adjustment that was made to the trade tax revenue for this study was to adjust the 
trade taxes collected by the five member states of the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU): Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.  Under SACU tax 
collection arrangements all customs and excise duties are pooled and shared across the 
member states.  These SACU revenues are typically reported as trade taxes, but about 
half of these revenues are excise duties on domestic consumption.  According the detailed 
reports from SACU administration from South African National Treasury on the annual 
composition of collections into the SACU pool were used to divide these revenues into 
trade and non-trade taxes. 
 
Other problems are known, but no adjustments were applied.  One example is the export 
tax charged by Ghana on cocoa.  In this case, the export tax serves double duty.  It is part 
income tax and part export duty.  Cocoa farmers are exempt from income tax and the 
export tax acts as a presumptive income tax, but it is all reported as a trade tax.   In 2000, 
for example, cocoa taxes equaled about 26% of the regular import duties collected.  It is 
not know what share of this is attributable to the tax that would have been collected on 
cocoa farming income and what residual is effectively an export duty.  Similar problems 
of tax classification arise with mining tax and non-tax revenues for oil and other minerals 
depending how the government takes its share of the resource rents between income 
taxes, royalties, selective sales taxes, export duties and dividends where it owns a share 
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of the mines.  Future studies may want to separate out “regular” import duties from other 
trade taxes. 
 
Another common problem of attribution also occurs in the cases of bonded 
manufacturing where import duties are charged on the sales into the domestic market.  
This type of problem is particularly acute in the cases where bonded oil refineries exist 
and all taxes and duties are charged on the ex-refinery sales into the domestic market 
rather than on the crude inputs into the refinery.  Such an example exists in Kenya.  In 
these cases, where both excise and import duties are charged on the refined product sales, 
the split is somewhat arbitrary and import duties can well be treated as excise duties on 
domestic consumption.  Given refined oil products are typically subject to high duty 
rates, this division of taxes can have a significant impact on estimates of trade taxes. 
 
The B&K study, as does this study, find it useful to make inter-country comparisons in 
terms of tax yields measured as a share of GDP.  GDP figures are taken from the World 
Bank Development Indicators database.  As discussed in Glenday (2005), ideally the 
GDP estimates should be for the same period as the revenue estimates.  This is not 
always the case as typically GDP figures are measured on a calendar year basis whereas 
revenue data is collected on a financial or fiscal year basis with only some countries 
using the calendar year as their financial year.  Many have financial years that end on the 
last day of the first, second or third quarters.  In WDI data fiscal year data, which is used 
in the B&K study, fiscal years ending on or before June 30 are reported in the year of the 
start of the fiscal year, while fiscal year data with a fiscal year ending after June 30 are 
reported in the year in which the fiscal year ends.  Given for possible differences between 
fiscal years of tax revenues and national accounts data, care has to be taken to adjust 
them to the same time period to avoid the tax yield relative to GDP being systematically 
over or under estimated.  This can clearly cause problems when making inter country 
comparisons.  It is not clear exactly how the ratios of taxes to GDP were calculated in the 
IMF database.  This is an area that deserves some careful scrutiny to help ensure the 
cleanest possible database for policy analysis. 
 
Another concern is the VAT collection data errors that appear in a few major databases. 
A common difficulty is reporting the VAT collections made by customs services on 
imports as the part of trade taxes rather than part of the VAT.  In such cases only the net 
domestic VAT collections are reported as VAT collections.  Such domestic collections 
are net of the VAT on imported inputs that are deducted from the domestic output VAT. 
As a result, total VAT collections that are actually in the 4% to 6% of GDP range are 
reported as only about 2% of GDP.  This problem is found in the IMF Government 
Financial Statistics (GFS) data as well as the Michigan University World Tax Database.  
For example, the Ghana Ministry of Finance reports VAT collections of Cedi 1,964 
billion or 5.2% of GDP in 2001, whereas the GFS database reports VAT of only Cedi 509 
billion or 1.3% of GDP, while the balance of Cedi 1,455 billion or 3.8% of GDP is 
reported as an “exchange tax” under taxes on international trade.  This last amount is 
actually the import VAT collection in 2001. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa
North Africa & 
Middle East Asia & Pacific Western Hemisphere Europe
Benin Mauritania Bangladesh Haiti
Burkina Faso Pakistan Bhutan
Burundi India
Cameroon Myanmar /a
Central Afr.Rep. Nepal
Chad Papua New Guinea
Comoros Solomon Islands
Congo, Rep. of
Côte d'Ivoire
Ethiopia
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Kenya
Lesotho
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sâo Tomé & Principe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Equatorial Guinea Algeria China Bolivia
Namibia Djibouti Fiji Colombia
South Africa Egypt Indonesia Dominican Republic
Swaziland Iran Kiribati Ecuador
Jordan Maldives El Salvador
Morocco Philippines Guatemala
Syria Sri Lanka Guyana
Tunisia Thailand Honduras
Tonga Jamaica
Vanuatu Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Botswana Oman Malaysia Antigua and Barbuda
Gabon Argentina
Mauritius Barbados
Seychelles Belize
Chile
Costa Rica
Dominica
Grenada
Panama
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent & Grenadines
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
Bahrain Brunei /a Bahamas
Kuwait Singapore
Korea Canada Austria
Australia United States Belgium
Japan Denmark
New Zealand Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
a.  Brunei and Myanmar were not used in the study as some basic economic structural variables were not available for these countries
Region
Income Class
Table A.2  Countries included in the trade tax sample
High income, OECD
High income, non-OECD
Upper middle income
Lower middle income
Low income
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Appendix B 
 
Annual average tax and trade tax yields, 1975-2000 
 
This appendix reports the average tax yield (total tax revenue as a share of GDP) for the 
countries in the Baunsgaard & Keen (2005) data set for each year 1975-2000 broken out 
by income groups in Table B.1.  The income groups recognized are low, lower middle, 
upper middle, high non-OECD and high OECD countries.  The averages are calculated 
both as the simple of average of the countries in the income group and the average 
weighted by the GDP of each country measured in constant 2000 US$.   The number of 
countries in each year and income group is also reported.   
 
Table B.2 reports the average trade tax yields in a similar fashion to the tax yields. 
 
Tables B.3 reports the share of trade taxes in the total taxes based in the results in Tables 
B.1 and B.2. 
 
 
 
 B-2 
LIC LMIC UMIC HI Non-
OECD
HI 
OECD
ALL LIC LMIC UMIC HI Non-
OECD
HI 
OECD
ALL LIC LMIC UMIC HI Non-
OECD
HI 
OECD
ALL
1975 13.55 18.55 22.95 16.39 32.02 23.22 10.34 16.13 24.77 16.88 28.23 27.60 12 17 7 2 24 62
1976 14.00 17.02 22.45 16.20 32.88 22.73 10.67 15.35 22.60 16.34 28.45 27.72 15 17 8 2 24 66
1977 15.72 17.22 24.08 11.74 33.38 23.24 10.58 16.44 22.14 9.23 29.07 28.26 16 16 9 3 24 68
1978 16.33 16.92 21.84 12.62 33.35 22.26 11.12 16.61 19.67 10.89 29.07 28.09 21 20 14 3 24 82
1979 15.90 17.73 22.95 11.19 33.31 21.74 12.40 15.30 20.90 7.56 29.21 28.00 28 26 18 3 24 99
1980 15.91 16.68 22.98 10.37 34.40 21.48 12.74 14.55 16.32 9.11 30.09 28.61 31 26 21 4 24 106
1981 15.75 16.39 23.57 10.58 35.18 21.41 12.48 15.10 17.98 10.90 30.56 29.07 33 29 21 4 24 111
1982 15.40 16.28 22.98 11.02 35.63 21.13 12.15 14.79 15.57 12.11 31.03 29.39 35 30 21 4 24 114
1983 15.20 16.31 22.84 11.96 35.89 21.09 11.84 15.04 15.45 12.09 30.47 28.87 36 30 21 4 24 115
1984 15.44 16.83 23.09 11.82 36.16 21.40 11.84 15.24 15.43 11.72 30.51 28.91 36 30 21 4 24 115
1985 15.03 17.65 23.91 10.82 36.16 21.50 12.18 18.67 18.71 10.37 30.80 29.43 36 33 21 4 24 118
1986 15.49 17.39 22.65 10.32 36.68 21.33 12.86 17.50 16.82 8.77 31.10 29.59 38 33 21 4 24 120
1987 14.07 17.30 20.77 9.73 36.88 20.52 11.92 15.93 12.67 9.01 31.74 29.94 38 34 21 4 24 121
1988 14.11 17.30 20.77 9.73 36.88 20.48 11.86 16.03 12.86 9.63 31.71 29.91 39 34 21 4 24 122
1989 14.13 17.47 20.14 10.00 36.61 20.38 11.66 16.65 12.86 10.03 31.86 30.09 39 34 21 4 24 122
1990 14.58 17.88 20.76 12.55 36.59 20.89 12.11 16.27 14.47 14.67 31.81 30.08 39 34 21 3 24 121
1991 13.73 17.62 21.44 12.93 36.56 20.67 11.68 15.69 15.04 15.25 31.70 29.90 39 34 21 3 24 121
1992 13.68 18.20 20.95 10.43 36.73 20.62 11.13 14.89 14.55 11.65 31.33 29.39 39 34 21 4 24 122
1993 13.09 17.91 21.61 10.76 36.78 20.48 9.75 14.61 15.58 11.37 31.36 29.29 39 34 21 4 24 122
1994 13.19 18.30 21.08 11.22 36.99 20.59 10.15 13.94 15.71 11.84 31.27 29.12 39 34 21 4 24 122
1995 13.63 18.20 21.07 11.15 36.78 20.64 10.45 13.68 15.12 11.37 31.59 29.32 39 35 21 4 24 123
1996 13.33 18.14 20.75 10.54 37.23 20.54 10.52 13.40 14.90 11.67 31.74 29.35 39 35 21 4 24 123
1997 13.51 18.26 21.43 10.16 37.50 20.78 10.37 14.00 15.62 11.50 31.98 29.57 39 35 21 4 24 123
1998 13.73 18.56 20.75 10.31 37.70 20.87 9.84 13.92 14.38 10.60 32.11 29.62 39 35 21 4 24 123
1999 13.77 18.41 20.85 11.02 38.15 20.83 10.13 14.67 14.28 11.66 32.13 29.69 39 35 21 4 23 122
2000 14.19 18.39 20.97 10.62 38.85 20.74 10.62 14.65 14.48 11.63 32.74 30.16 38 33 20 4 20 115
LIC = Low income country; LMIC = Lower middle income country; UMIC = Upper middle income country; HI Non-OECD = High income, non-OECD country; HI 
OECD = High income OECD country
Table B.1 Average tax revenue over GDP for countries in various income classes by year for 1975-2000
Average country tax revenue over GDP GDP weighted average tax revenue over 
GDP
Number of countries in sample
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LIC LMIC UMIC HI Non-
OECD
HI 
OECD
ALL LIC LMIC UMIC HI Non-
OECD
HI 
OECD
ALL LIC LMIC UMIC HI Non-
OECD
HI 
OECD
ALL
1975 4.40 5.56 4.39 5.83 1.06 3.43 2.37 3.02 2.61 2.65 0.45 0.57 12 16 7 2 24 61
1976 4.50 4.45 3.83 6.36 1.06 3.17 2.56 2.68 2.65 2.81 0.47 0.60 14 16 8 2 24 64
1977 5.44 4.10 4.54 4.04 1.05 3.39 2.73 3.05 2.86 1.67 0.44 0.59 16 15 9 3 24 67
1978 5.98 4.81 4.91 4.11 0.98 3.99 3.21 3.35 2.90 1.71 0.44 0.61 22 20 13 3 24 82
1979 5.77 5.03 5.57 4.12 0.95 4.29 3.52 2.52 2.86 1.53 0.44 0.63 28 26 16 3 24 97
1980 5.53 4.83 5.87 4.02 0.89 4.29 3.65 2.34 3.08 1.76 0.41 0.60 31 26 19 4 24 104
1981 5.58 5.13 5.56 3.74 0.89 4.38 3.76 2.55 2.24 1.76 0.39 0.62 33 29 21 4 24 111
1982 5.24 4.84 5.38 4.03 0.85 4.19 3.62 2.27 2.02 2.04 0.39 0.60 35 30 21 4 24 114
1983 5.04 4.79 5.42 4.69 0.83 4.15 3.42 2.20 2.10 2.10 0.38 0.58 36 30 21 4 24 115
1984 5.19 5.09 5.15 4.59 0.84 4.23 3.59 2.21 1.96 1.98 0.39 0.60 36 30 21 4 24 115
1985 5.38 5.09 5.09 4.35 0.77 4.28 3.89 2.43 2.48 1.81 0.37 0.61 36 33 21 4 24 118
1986 5.56 4.77 5.55 4.12 0.72 4.32 4.09 2.09 2.22 1.72 0.36 0.58 38 33 21 4 24 120
1987 4.85 4.76 5.55 3.99 0.74 4.10 4.09 1.99 2.08 1.59 0.38 0.60 38 34 21 4 24 121
1988 4.50 4.68 5.86 3.78 0.67 3.99 3.75 1.88 1.91 1.51 0.38 0.57 39 34 20 4 24 121
1989 4.47 4.63 5.59 3.53 0.64 3.91 3.74 2.07 2.43 1.33 0.35 0.57 39 34 20 4 24 121
1990 4.31 4.91 5.44 4.17 0.59 3.91 3.73 1.94 1.89 1.40 0.33 0.53 39 33 20 3 24 119
1991 4.15 4.55 5.19 4.11 0.56 3.71 3.45 1.85 1.71 1.37 0.31 0.51 39 33 20 3 24 119
1992 4.19 4.61 5.03 4.33 0.51 3.71 3.27 1.79 1.74 1.35 0.30 0.50 39 33 20 3 24 119
1993 4.02 4.39 4.97 3.31 0.42 3.54 2.89 1.72 1.59 1.09 0.28 0.47 39 33 20 4 24 120
1994 4.05 4.27 4.57 3.52 0.38 3.45 2.98 1.57 1.50 1.04 0.29 0.47 39 33 20 4 24 120
1995 3.96 4.25 4.28 3.44 0.36 3.36 3.16 1.47 1.40 0.94 0.27 0.46 39 34 20 4 24 121
1996 3.78 4.17 3.73 3.02 0.33 3.17 3.23 1.37 1.36 0.87 0.26 0.44 39 34 20 4 24 121
1997 3.61 3.96 3.56 3.15 0.32 3.03 2.91 1.24 1.53 0.89 0.24 0.42 39 34 20 4 24 121
1998 3.47 3.81 3.63 3.19 0.19 3.02 2.65 1.18 1.35 0.97 0.17 0.34 39 34 19 4 20 116
1999 3.24 3.62 3.40 3.16 0.12 2.86 2.63 1.22 1.21 0.95 0.14 0.32 39 34 19 4 19 115
2000 3.12 3.68 3.07 2.88 0.05 2.92 2.43 1.24 1.06 0.83 0.13 0.31 38 32 18 4 12 104
LIC = Low income country; LMIC = Lower middle income country; UMIC = Upper middle income country; HI Non-OECD = High income, non-OECD country; HI 
OECD = High income OECD country
Average country trade tax revenue over 
GDP
GDP weighted average trade tax revenue 
over GDP
Number of countries in sample
Table B.2 Average trade tax revenue over GDP for countries in various income classes by year for 1975-2000
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LIC LMIC UMIC HI Non-
OECD
HI OECD ALL LIC LMIC UMIC HI Non-
OECD
HI OECD ALL
1975 32% 30% 19% 36% 3.3% 15% 23% 19% 11% 16% 1.6% 2.1%
1976 32% 26% 17% 39% 3.2% 14% 24% 17% 12% 17% 1.7% 2.2%
1977 35% 24% 19% 34% 3.1% 15% 26% 19% 13% 18% 1.5% 2.1%
1978 37% 28% 23% 33% 2.9% 18% 29% 20% 15% 16% 1.5% 2.2%
1979 36% 28% 24% 37% 2.9% 20% 28% 16% 14% 20% 1.5% 2.2%
1980 35% 29% 26% 39% 2.6% 20% 29% 16% 19% 19% 1.4% 2.1%
1981 35% 31% 24% 35% 2.5% 20% 30% 17% 12% 16% 1.3% 2.1%
1982 34% 30% 23% 37% 2.4% 20% 30% 15% 13% 17% 1.2% 2.0%
1983 33% 29% 24% 39% 2.3% 20% 29% 15% 14% 17% 1.2% 2.0%
1984 34% 30% 22% 39% 2.3% 20% 30% 15% 13% 17% 1.3% 2.1%
1985 36% 29% 21% 40% 2.1% 20% 32% 13% 13% 17% 1.2% 2.1%
1986 36% 27% 24% 40% 2.0% 20% 32% 12% 13% 20% 1.2% 2.0%
1987 34% 28% 27% 41% 2.0% 20% 34% 13% 16% 18% 1.2% 2.0%
1988 32% 27% 28% 39% 1.8% 19% 32% 12% 15% 16% 1.2% 1.9%
1989 32% 27% 28% 35% 1.7% 19% 32% 12% 19% 13% 1.1% 1.9%
1990 30% 27% 26% 33% 1.6% 19% 31% 12% 13% 10% 1.0% 1.8%
1991 30% 26% 24% 32% 1.5% 18% 30% 12% 11% 9% 1.0% 1.7%
1992 31% 25% 24% 42% 1.4% 18% 29% 12% 12% 12% 1.0% 1.7%
1993 31% 25% 23% 31% 1.1% 17% 30% 12% 10% 10% 0.9% 1.6%
1994 31% 23% 22% 31% 1.0% 17% 29% 11% 10% 9% 0.9% 1.6%
1995 29% 23% 20% 31% 1.0% 16% 30% 11% 9% 8% 0.9% 1.6%
1996 28% 23% 18% 29% 0.9% 15% 31% 10% 9% 7% 0.8% 1.5%
1997 27% 22% 17% 31% 0.9% 15% 28% 9% 10% 8% 0.8% 1.4%
1998 25% 21% 17% 31% 0.5% 14% 27% 8% 9% 9% 0.5% 1.2%
1999 23% 20% 16% 29% 0.3% 14% 26% 8% 8% 8% 0.4% 1.1%
2000 22% 20% 15% 27% 0.1% 14% 23% 8% 7% 7% 0.4% 1.0%
Trade taxes as share of taxes for average country Trade taxes as share of taxes for GDP-weighted average 
country
Table B.3  Trade tax revenue as share of total tax revenue for countries in various income classes by year for 1975-2000
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Appendix C 
 
Effect of country size on imports and trade taxes as a share of 
GDP 
 
1. Estimate of import share 
 
Dependent variable:  
Import value of goods as share of GDP (%) (WDI 2005)) 
 
Explanatory variables: 
 Population (WDI 2005) 
 GDP in constant 2000 US$ (WDI 2005) 
 GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$ 
 Income group dummy variables  
  LIC =1 for low income country 
  LMIC = 1 for lower middle income variable 
  UMIC = 1 for upper middle income country 
  Indust =1 for high-income OECD county 
  High-income non-OECD country is excluded group 
 
Dependent variable:  Imports of goods as a share of GDP
Sample: 123 countries, 1975-2000
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Constant 86.217 39.0 33.331 43.6
Population -1.40E-07 -9.0 -1.56E-07 -9.3
Population squared 1.15E-16 7.9 1.33E-16 8.4
GDP -6.90E-12 -3.4 -1.41E-11 -6.3
GDP squared 1.01E-24 3.8 1.96E-24 6.7
GDP per capita 1.45E-03 7.5
GDP per capita squared -4.45E-08 -6.4
LIC -56.364 -23.8
LMIC -50.491 -21.2
UMIC -44.524 -18.2
Indust -54.495 -21.7
Sample size 2,786         2,777         
Adjusted R-squared 24.3% 9.6%
F-statistic 112.63 49.94
Mean dependent variable 32.85
Std. Dev dependent variable 27.52
 C-2 
Estimates show imports of goods as share of GDP declining with larger country size as 
measured by population and real GDP, but rate of decline decreases with as country size 
grows. 
 
 
2. Estimate of trade tax yield 
 
Dependent variable:  
Trade tax revenue as share of GDP (B&K, IMF 2005) 
 
Explanatory variables: 
Import value of goods as share of GDP (%) (WDI 2005)) 
Year = Calendar year, 1975 through 2000 
Other variables as above 
 
 
 
 
Estimates show trade tax share increasing with the import share (which declines with 
population size) and decreasing with country size as measured by either population or 
real GDP, but rate of decline decreases with an increase in country size. 
Dependent Variable:  Trade tax revenue as a share of GDP
Sample: 123 countries, 1975-2000
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Constant -270.510 -3.58 -250.222 -3.28
Population -9.15E-09 -5.78
Population squared 6.79E-18 4.42
GDP -4.27E-13 -1.90
GDP squared 6.87E-26 2.18
Imports of goods as share of GDP 0.047 20.25 0.045 18.97
Year 0.136 3.58 0.126 3.28
LIC 493.185 6.06 477.776 5.82
LIC*Year -0.246 -6.01 -0.238 -5.77
LMIC 447.596 5.44 417.146 5.03
LMIC*Year -0.223 -5.40 -0.208 -4.99
UMIC 435.397 5.14 416.994 4.89
UMIC*Year -0.217 -5.11 -0.208 -4.85
Indust 363.751 4.41 333.756 4.01
Indust*Year -0.183 -4.41 -0.168 -4.01
Sample size 2,670                     2,693                 
Adjusted R-squared 33.7% 35.0%
F-statistic 113.85                   121.64               
Mean dependent variable 3.64                       
Std Dev dependent variable 3.50                      
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Appendix D 
 
Average trade and total tax adjustments over 1975-2000 for 
each country 
 
Based on the trends estimated in the trade tax and (total) tax yields of each the 123 
countries in the Baunsgaard & Keen (2005) data set over the sample period of 1975-
2000, estimates of the changes in the trade tax and total tax over the period are made as 
well as mid-point estimates (which are estimates of the average trade tax and tax yields of 
each country over this period.)  For each country its tax adjustment experience is put into 
one of the following three adjustment patterns: 
 
4. Trade tax yield reduction with either complete or partial replacement by 
non-trade taxes.  Complete replacement is observed when the change in trade 
tax yield is negative, but change in total tax yield is positive.  Partial 
replacement is observed when the reduction in total tax yield is less than the 
reduction in the trade tax yield. 
5. Both trade tax yields AND non-trade tax yields declined.   These cases are 
observed when the trade tax yield was reduced, but the reduction in total tax 
yield was even higher. 
6. Trade tax yields increased, and either an increase in total tax revenues or 
a decrease in total tax revenues.  Where yields in total taxes rose, the trade 
taxes either completely offset a non-trade tax decline or contributed to 
increase in all tax revenues. Where total tax yields declined, the trade tax yield 
increases offset some of the decline.   
 
The results are for the 123 countries are broken out into five tables (Tables D.1 –D.5) 
each covering the countries in an income group and with the table the results are broken 
out by region (Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa & Middle East, Asia & Pacific, Western 
Hemisphere, and Europe) and by the three adjustment patterns in taxes.   The income 
groups contain the following numbers of countries: 
 
Table D.1:  39 low-income countries 
Table D.2:  35 lower middle-income countries 
Table D.3:  21 upper middle-income countries 
Table D.4:  4 high-income non-OECD countries 
Table D.5:  24 high-income OECD countries 
 
The 23 countries, which had an average trade tax yield above 6%, are highlighted.
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Change in 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP 
over 25 years 
(%)
Change in 
Trade Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 25 
years (%)
Change in 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP 
over 25 years 
(%)
Change in 
Trade Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 25 
years (%)
Change in 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP 
over 25 years 
(%)
Change in 
Trade Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 25 
years (%)
Region  and 
country
Average Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 
1975-2000 
(%)
Average Trade 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP over 
1975-2000 (%) Country
Average Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 
1975-2000 (%)
Average Trade 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP over 
1975-2000 (%)
Contribution 
rate of trade 
tax increase  
to tax loss Country
Average Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 
1975-2000 
(%)
Average Trade 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP over 
1975-2000 (%)
Sub-Saharan Africa
Tax revenue increases
Gambia -1.5 -15.8 91% Congo, Rep. of -31.6 -2.0 6% Lesotho 12.1 4.6 38%
19.8 10.0 23.2 3.9 33.9 10.3
Comoros -0.2 -9.0 98% Sâo Tomé & Principe -20.7 -11.5 56% Ghana 10.9 1.1 10%
11.3 7.1 18.1 7.9 11.1 3.8
Benin -3.7 -8.9 59% Togo -16.7 -7.0 42% Chad 5.7 1.0 17%
12.4 5.4 18.6 7.0 4.3 1.5
Côte d'Ivoire -6.3 -7.2 13% Nigeria -12.4 -0.2 2% Zimbabwe 4.7 3.5 75%
19.0 6.9 15.9 2.4 22.7 3.5
Cameroon -1.7 -5.9 71% Mozambique -10.8 -0.8 8% Mali 0.5 1.8 374%
14.8 3.5 15.1 2.6 12.1 3.7
Senegal -5.1 -5.2 2% Guinea -9.2 -2.4 26%
16.7 6.6 13.4 2.1 Tax revenue decreases
Rwanda -3.1 -4.9 36% Madagascar -7.4 -2.5 34% Zambia -5.5 5.0 -47%
9.8 3.8 11.0 3.6 19.5 4.4
Burkina Faso -1.2 -4.5 73% Central Afr.Rep. -6.8 -3.3 49% Tanzania -7.0 0.1 -1%
11.3 4.1 10.0 4.3 15.3 2.0
Kenya -2.4 -3.7 33% Sierra Leone -6.7 -4.9 74%
23.6 4.8 12.4 5.2
Niger -4.5 -1.5 34%
8.7 3.7
Uganda 3.9 -3.7 205% Ethiopia -3.7 -2.5 66%
8.7 3.7 14.0 3.2
Burundi 3.8 -3.2 216%
13.9 4.6
Malawi 3.4 -0.3 1073%
17.3 3.7
North Africa & Middle East
Mauritania 0.5 -2.7 117%
17.1 6.5
Pakistan 1.4 -1.7 184%
12.9 4.5
Asia & Pacific
Tax revenue increases
Bangladesh -0.8 -1.6 49% Papua New Guinea 8.4 2.0 23%
8.0 3.0 18.9 5.3
Complete replacement Bhutan 5.3 0.5 10%
Solomon Islands 2.5 -3.8 167% 6.3 0.2
21.4 12.5 Nepal 2.8 0.6 22%
7.3 2.6
Tax revenue decreases
India -1.1 0.5 -34%
9.8 2.9
Western Hemisphere
Haiti -6.4 -3.4 53%
8.1 2.5
Table D.1.    Trend or average adjustments in total taxes and trade taxes as share of GDP,  and average total and trade taxes as share of GDP over 
1975-2000
Partial replacement
Complete replacement
Trade tax increase 
Replacement 
rate = Increase 
in non-trade 
taxes offsetting 
decrease in trade 
taxes
Trade tax 
contribution 
to tax 
increase (or 
reduction in 
tax loss)
Low income countries
Partial replacement
Complete replacement
Trade tax decrease offset by non-trade 
tax replacement
Trade tax decrease AND non-trade tax 
decrease
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Change in 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP 
over 25 years 
(%)
Change in 
Trade Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 25 
years (%)
Change in 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP 
over 25 years 
(%)
Change in 
Trade Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 25 
years (%)
Change in 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP 
over 25 years 
(%)
Change in 
Trade Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 25 
years (%)
Region  and 
country
Average Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 
1975-2000 
(%)
Average Trade 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP over 
1975-2000 (%) Country
Average Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 
1975-2000 (%)
Average Trade 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP over 
1975-2000 (%)
Contribution 
rate of trade 
tax increase  
to tax loss Country
Average Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 
1975-2000 (%)
Average Trade 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP over 
1975-2000 (%)
Sub-Saharan Africa
Complete replacement Tax revenue increases
Equatorial Guinea 1.2 -13.4 109% Egypt -12.2 -6.0 49% Morocco 4.0 0.2 5%
14.7 7.7 21.6 5.0 21.5 4.6
Namibia 3.7 -3.6 202%
28.6 5.8 Tax revenue decreases
Swaziland 0.1 -0.9 113% Djibouti -3.8 0.2 -4%
28.4 7.4 25.9 1.8
South Africa 5.6 0.0 39818% Algeria -9.0 1.3 -13%
22.9 0.4 14.1 2.2
North Africa & Middle East
Complete replacement
Tunisia 1.4 -4.6 130%
24.7 7.0
Jordan 6.2 -3.8 264%
13.6 5.9
Syria 10.8 -2.4 560%
15.7 2.5
Iran 0.3 -2.0 113%
8.9 1.7
Asia & Pacific
Complete replacement Tax revenue increases
Tonga 4.8 -8.7 156% China -4.8 -0.8 16% Maldives 9.0 5.4 60%
18.0 8.8 14.9 1.0 14.9 9.4
Vanuatu -0.4 -8.3 95% Indonesia -4.0 -1.4 35% Kiribati 7.6 7.0 93%
20.0 14.0 16.6 1.1 21.6 13.7
Sri Lanka -2.5 -5.3 52%
17.3 5.5
Thailand 4.9 -1.3 482%
14.5 3.0
Philippines 7.9 -0.1 13161%
12.8 4.0
Partial replacement
Samoa -1.9 -12.4 85%
27.2 13.0
Western Hemisphere
Complete replacement Tax revenue increases
Peru 0.7 -3.0 125% Guyana -5.4 -4.8 89% Jamaica 3.4 1.8 52%
13.0 2.4 32.8 4.1 23.3 2.2
Honduras 7.3 -2.1 438% Dominican Republic 3.6 0.7 20%
15.1 4.7 12.8 5.2
Guatemala 0.9 -1.8 150% Paraguay 1.5 0.3 19%
7.9 2.0 9.9 1.8
Colombia 0.5 -1.6 134%
10.7 1.8
Ecuador 1.3 -1.3 203%
7.8 2.3
Bolivia 15.6 -0.8 2126%
12.8 1.6
Partial replacement
Suriname -1.4 -7.6 82%
22.3 7.5
El Salvador -2.2 -4.6 54%
10.8 2.9
Table D.2.    Trend or average adjustments in total taxes and trade taxes as share of GDP,  and average total and trade taxes as share of GDP over 
1975-2000
Lower middle income countries
Trade tax decrease offset by non-trade 
tax replacement
Trade tax decrease AND non-trade tax 
decrease
Trade tax increase 
Replacement 
rate = Increase 
in non-trade 
taxes offsetting 
decrease in trade 
taxes
Trade tax 
contribution 
to tax 
increase (or 
reduction in 
tax loss)
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Change in 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP 
over 25 years 
(%)
Change in 
Trade Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 25 
years (%)
Change in 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP 
over 25 years 
(%)
Change in 
Trade Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 25 
years (%)
Change in 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP 
over 25 years 
(%)
Change in 
Trade Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 25 
years (%)
Region  and country
Average Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 
1975-2000 
(%)
Average Trade 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP over 
1975-2000 (%) Country
Average Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 
1975-2000 (%)
Average Trade 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP over 
1975-2000 (%)
Contribution 
rate of trade 
tax increase  
to tax loss Country
Average Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 
1975-2000 (%)
Average Trade 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP over 
1975-2000 (%)
Sub-Saharan Africa
Complete replacement
Botswana 4.7 -2.9 261% Gabon -5.9 -4.6 78%
34.6 4.4 27.2 5.3
Seychelles 5.4 -1.9 379%
34.8 16.1
Partial replacement
Mauritius -1.4 -3.4 58%
19.0 9.0
North Africa & Middle East
Tax revenue decreases
Oman -11.0 0.5 -4%
10.6 0.8
Asia & Pacific
Partial replacement
Malaysia -5.2 -6.0 14%
19.7 4.9
Western Hemisphere
Complete replacement Tax revenue decreases
Barbados 5.0 -4.4 212% Trinidad & Tobago -13.4 -1.7 13% Chile -8.2 0.2 -3%
27.6 3.9 27.6 1.9 20.2 2.1
Belize 0.9 -4.2 122% Venezuela -12.4 -0.2 2% St. Kitts & Nevis -1.0 1.0 -52%
20.5 10.8 18.3 1.7 21.3 7.1
St. Lucia 1.5 -3.4 145% Panama -11.0 -0.8 7%
22.3 7.0 15.0 2.5
Uruguay 7.8 -1.7 561% Dominica -1.3 -0.9 69%
23.1 1.8 25.6 4.0
Partial replacement
Antigua and Barbuda -0.1 -2.5 95%
17.7 4.3
Argentina -1.0 -1.1 16%
11.9 1.2
Costa Rica -2.0 -5.0 59%
13.1 3.9
Grenada -4.3 -6.9 38%
23.5 5.5
St. Vincent & Grenadines -1.2 -9.4 87%
24.5 6.0
Trade tax decrease offset by non-trade 
tax replacement
Trade tax decrease AND non-trade tax 
decrease
Trade tax increase 
Table D.3.    Trend or average adjustments in total taxes and trade taxes as share of GDP,  and average total and trade taxes as share of GDP over 1975-
2000
Upper middle income countries
Replacement 
rate = Increase 
in non-trade 
taxes offsetting 
decrease in 
trade taxes
Trade tax 
contribution 
to tax 
increase (or 
reduction in 
tax loss)
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Change in Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 25 
years (%)
Change in Trade 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP over 
25 years (%)
Change in Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 25 
years (%)
Change in Trade 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP over 
25 years (%)
Change in Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 25 
years (%)
Change in 
Trade Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 25 
years (%)
Region  and 
country
Average Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 1975-
2000 (%)
Average Trade 
Tax Revenue over 
GDP over 1975-
2000 (%) Country
Average Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 1975-
2000 (%)
Average Trade 
Tax Revenue over 
GDP over 1975-
2000 (%)
Contribution 
rate of trade 
tax increase  
to tax loss Country
Average Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 1975-
2000 (%)
Average Trade 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP over 
1975-2000 (%)
North Africa & Middle East
Kuwait -3.3 -0.3 8%
2.3 0.9
Bahrain -0.5 -0.4 75%
7.5 2.5
Asia & Pacific
Partial replacement
Singapore -1.7 -1.9 9%
16.5 0.9
Western Hemisphere
Complete replacement
Bahamas 2.2 -1.8 220%
16.4 10.2
Trade tax decrease offset by non-trade tax Trade tax decrease AND non-trade tax Trade tax increase
Table D.4.    Trend or average adjustments in total taxes and trade taxes as share of GDP,  and average total and trade taxes as share of GDP o
2000
High income non -OECD countries
Replacement 
rate = Increase in 
non-trade taxes 
offsetting 
decrease in trade 
taxes
 D-6 
Change in Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 25 
years (%)
Change in Trade 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP over 
25 years (%)
Change in Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 25 
years (%)
Change in Trade 
Tax Revenue 
over GDP over 
25 years (%)
Region  and 
country
Average Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 1975-
2000 (%)
Average Trade 
Tax Revenue over 
GDP over 1975-
2000 (%) Country
Average Tax 
Revenue over 
GDP over 1975-
2000 (%)
Average Trade 
Tax Revenue over 
GDP over 1975-
2000 (%)
Asia & Pacific
Complete replacement
Korea 3.6 -2.1 272%
16.0 2.0
Australia 2.3 -1.0 324%
29.8 1.0
New Zealand 6.4 -0.5 1421%
35.1 0.9
Japan 4.6 -0.2 2252%
27.1 0.2
Western Hemisphere
Complete replacement
Canada 6.0 -1.4 543%
34.5 0.8
United States 2.9 -0.1 4465%
26.4 0.3
Europe
Complete replacement
Iceland 10.5 -6.4 263% Luxembourg -7.0 -0.1 1%
30.3 2.8 44.1 0.1
Portugal 8.1 -2.6 414% Ireland -1.7 -0.9 51%
30.9 1.0 34.5 0.5
Greece 5.9 -2.2 368% Netherlands -1.0 -0.3 31%
31.6 0.8 43.1 0.6
Spain 16.1 -0.8 2195%
30.1 0.5
Austria 5.5 -0.6 944%
41.7 0.4
Belgium 3.4 -0.5 721%
44.0 0.5
Finland 11.5 -0.5 2380%
42.2 0.3
United Kingdom 0.2 -0.5 137%
35.7 0.4
Sweden 3.3 -0.5 834%
50.9 0.5
Germany 0.2 -0.4 146%
37.6 0.3
Switzerland 5.6 -0.4 1605%
31.2 0.4
Denmark 10.1 -0.2 4861%
46.9 0.2
France 7.2 -0.2 3800%
42.6 0.2
Italy 18.8 -0.1 18633%
36.6 0.1
Norway 0.0 -0.1 132%
42.0 0.2
Table D.5.    Trend or average adjustments in total taxes and trade taxes as share of GDP,  and average 
total and trade taxes as share of GDP over 1975-2000
High incomeOECD countries
Trade tax decrease offset by non-trade tax 
replacement
Trade tax decrease AND non-trade tax 
decrease
Replacement 
rate = Increase 
in non-trade 
taxes offsetting 
decrease in trade 
taxes
Contribution 
rate of trade 
tax increase  
to tax loss
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Appendix E 
 
Estimations of tax capacity 
 
To analyze the importance of structural features in limiting tax yields (tax revenues as a 
share of GDP) across countries, comparisons of the tax yield across countries will be 
made taking into account the effects of a number of structural characteristics such as per 
capita income, the importance of imports, and the relative size of the agricultural sector. 
These comparisons will be made using standard economic regression techniques, but this 
analysis will introduce a number of innovations not included in previous studies.25 These 
innovations include controlling for (a) the changes in incentives of governments to collect 
taxes when other sources of revenue such as foreign aid grants or non-tax revenues are 
available, and (b) the external imbalances of the economy that affect the size of 
consumption tax bases, such as net inflows of foreign factor income or transfers.    
 
The basic model that will be estimated is  
 
T/Y   =  α + β1Ypc + β2 (Ypc)2 + β3X3  + …+ βiXi  + β’3DjX3  + …+ β’iDjXi  + βi+1Zi+1  + 
…..+ βjZj   + βkT   + β’k DjT   + ε 
 
The elements of this model are explained in more detail below.  In general: 
  
• T/Y is the tax yield (or tax effort) that make up the tax revenues of a central 
government as share of GDP,   
• Ypc is the per capita income of each country expressed in a quadratic of per capita 
income to allow for the changing impact of per capita income at different income 
levels,  
• X i  are the structural features of the economy that affect the capacity to raise tax 
revenues,  
• Dj are dummies for countries in different income groups to identify whether 
structural features have different impacts within these different income groups, 
• Zj  are the characteristics of other revenue sources affect the incentives to collect 
taxes, and 
• T is time, which is included to capture the net affect of all omitted variables that 
have a systematic affect on the tax yield over time, and ε is random normal 
variable that captures the unexplained variations in the tax yield.   
 
This linear specification is the usual specification used and is appropriate as it allows for 
the independent effects of different structural features.  A relationship of the logarithm of 
tax effort explained by the logarithm of the structural variable assumes that they have 
multiplicative effects on the tax yield such that improvements in any one structural 
                                                 
25 A.R.Prest “ The Taxable Capacity of a Country” in Toye J.F. (ed), Taxation and Economic Development, 
London,1979; Richard Goode, Government Finance in Developing Countries, Brookings Institution, 
Washington DC (1984), Chap 4.  
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feature has a larger impact the more favorable are all other structural features.  (See 
Piancastelli (2001), Ebrill et al (2001), and Katusiime (2003))26.  
 
While some synergies no doubt exist among structural characteristics, it is not necessarily 
true in all, and certainly not in many important cases.  For example, large mining sectors 
or large share of imports in countries with otherwise unfavorable tax collection 
characteristics under a multiplicative model would make relatively low impacts on 
revenue collection performance, but in countries with good revenue collection 
characteristics they would make large impacts on its revenue yield.  While to some extent 
this may be the case, an economy with generally poor revenue capacity is likely to focus 
its limited revenue collection resources on the mining sector or import flows, whereas a 
higher capacity economy may put a more modest effort into collecting from the mining 
sector or imports given its range of alternative sources.   Good tax handles can clearly 
benefit low-income countries despite otherwise unfavorable tax collection characteristics. 
 
The range of structural features that can be used to explain the tax yield in a country is 
limited by the availability of data across countries.   For example, accountants typically 
play an important role in compliance with self-assessed taxes such as the income tax and 
VAT, but data on the number and quality of accountants is not generally available across 
countries.  Another instance is that typically the value added in the agricultural sector as a 
share of the economy is used to capture the importance of the unfavorable characteristics 
of this sector on tax collections.  The structure of agricultural sectors across countries, 
however, may vary in ways that impact tax collections.   For example, an agricultural 
sector dominated by large corporate farms producing cash crops is different, tax-wise, 
from one dominated by small farmers producing food crops.   Importantly, the database 
used here has extensive coverage of central government taxes, but not of other sources of 
public sector revenues, such as revenues of sub-national governments.  These limitations 
in the data have to be recognized in making cross-country comparisons. 
 
The data used in this analysis is described in Appendix A, which indicates some 
adjustments to the B&K data set and some of its limitations. 
                                                 
26  Piancastelli only presents estimates of tax yield as log-log specification, while Katusiime presents the 
log-log as an alternative specification.   Ebrill et al explain the log (θ/(1−θ), where θ is a measure of the 
revenue ratio, in terms of the logs of explanatory variables. 
Marcelo Piancastelli, Measuring the Tax Effort of Developed and Developing Countries, Cross Country 
Panel Data Analysis –1985/95, IPEA, Rio Janeiro, Brazil, 2001   
Liam Ebrill, Michael Keen, Jean Paul Bodin and Victoria Summers, The Modern VAT, International 
Monetary Fund (2001) 
Frank M. Katusiime, “Measuring Tax Performance among Esat African Countries’” URA Fiscal Bulletin, 
Vol 2 (no 1) June 2003, pp 1-50 
 E-3 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Constant 28.259 62.03 122.380 2.88 125.687 3.64 19.055 0.35 18.843 14.08 16.628 9.46
Agruclture as share of GDP -0.101 -2.39 0.324 8.66 -0.100 -2.41 0.197 3.10 0.132 1.26 0.337 2.33
Agruclture as share of 
GDP*LIC -0.311 -7.71 -0.432 -12.87 -0.096 -2.16 -0.412 -6.16 -0.345 -3.71 -0.506 -3.96
Agruclture as share of 
GDP*LMIC -0.452 -10.38 -0.486 -13.55 0.008 0.17 -0.124 -1.82 -0.463 -4.93 -0.629 -4.76
Imports of goods as share of 
GDP -0.024 -2.43 -0.045 -5.72 0.053 6.49 0.060 5.89 -0.098 -6.34 -0.021 -1.14
Imports of goods as share of 
GDP*(LIC+LMIC) 0.070 5.37 0.210 16.55 0.112 8.56 0.087 5.29 0.187 6.63 0.210 5.18
Foreign transfers and income 
as share of GDP -0.032 -0.87 0.052 1.69 -0.060 -1.65 0.306 2.32 0.589 3.53
Foreign transfers and income 
as share of 
GDP*(LIC+LMIC) 0.023 0.59 -0.078 -2.40 0.067 1.70 -0.175 -1.30 -0.499 -2.97
Mining sector as share of 
GDP 0.011 0.62 0.273 4.71
Mining sector as share of 
GDP*(LIC+LMIC) 0.080 2.47
Grants and other income as 
share of GDP -0.152 -2.96 -0.499 -2.97
GDP per capita 0.001756 22.99 0.00058 4.77 0.000702 3.85 0.001315 7.94 0.000349 3.83
GDP per capita squared -2.82E-08 -11.46 -9.44E-09 -3.32 -1.43E-08 -3.11 -1.7E-08 -3.65
Year -0.055 -2.58 -0.062 -3.57 -0.010 -0.36
Year*LIC 0.005 6.37 0.007 6.23
Year*LMIC 0.005 7.12 0.004 4.72
Year*UMIC 0.008 17.35 0.007 13.67
Year*Indust 0.014 32.01 0.015 26.24
Asia&Pacific 2.280 5.86 1.618 3.10
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.213 15.91 6.773 13.56
Sample Size 2518 2493 2493 1485 559 229
Adjusted R squared 33.3% 58.6% 73.2% 75.8% 53.7% 49.0%
F -statistic 252.78 354.29 427.42 258.64 65.68 22.90
Mean of dependent variable 21.06 21.80 19.38 18.23
Standard deviation of 
dependent variable 10.95 11.39 9.76 8.18
Table E.1   Estimates of tax capacity (Taxes as a share of GDP) across 123 countries, 1975-2000
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Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Constant 14.911 32.79 168.297 4.02 183.960 4.51 19.432 15.52 17.455 9.55 18.703 6.86
Agruclture as share of 
GDP -0.121 -5.97 -0.090 -3.43 -0.120 -4.58 -0.116 -3.48 -0.195 -3.50 -0.136 -1.64
Agruclture as share of 
GDP*LIC -0.040 -2.26 -0.115 -3.71 -0.080 -2.63 -0.118 -4.38 -0.003 -0.06 -0.111 -1.63
Imports of goods as share 
of GDP 0.143 15.14 0.175 15.57 0.050 2.41 0.146 10.82 0.135 4.83 0.155 2.67
Imports of goods as share 
of GDP*LIC 0.051 4.20 0.038 1.78 0.156 14.12 0.067 3.00 0.056 1.62 0.156 2.24
Foreign transfers and 
income as share of GDP -0.048 -3.09 -0.051 -3.37 -0.072 -2.28 0.087 1.41 0.141 1.13
Foreign transfers and 
income as share of 
GDP*LIC 0.005 0.22 0.009 0.40 0.050 1.34 -0.029 -0.41 -0.156 -1.17
Mining sector as share of 
GDP 0.101 3.78 0.216 3.05
Grants and other income as 
share of GDP -0.216 -4.28 -0.430 -6.11
GDP per capita -0.003278 -4.33 -0.002051 -2.74 -0.006052 -6.34 -0.001747 -1.09 -0.004757 -1.91
GDP per capita squared 9.350E-07 5.57 4.350E-07 2.52 1.340E-06 6.40 8.330E-07 2.23 1.380E-06 2.66
Year -0.077 -3.65 -0.085 -4.13
Year*LIC 0.001 1.43 -0.001 -1.74
Asia&Pacific 0.896 2.16
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.297 9.00
Sample Size 1467 1459 1459 836 367 152
Adjusted R squared 37.0% 39.4% 42.9% 44.6% 48.8% 70.2%
F -statistic 216.5 95.6 92.4 75.6 39.8 36.5
Mean of dependent 
variable 15.78 15.75 16.37 16.38 17.60
Standard deviation of 
dependent variable 6.84 6.81 7.29 6.94 7.93
Table E.2   Estimates of tax capacity (Taxes as a share of GDP) across 74 low- and lower-middle-income countries, 1975-2000
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Appendix F 
 
Malawi:  A case of ineffective high standard surtax rates27 
The VAT is often viewed as a major source of potential revenue enhancement to replace 
revenues as trade taxes are reduced and, even more generally, to reduce government 
deficits.  While a broad-based VAT in developing countries can be expected to increase 
its tax yields over time as tax compliance improves and the formal sector expands as a 
share of an economy raising the effective size of the VAT base, in the medium term, 
increased VAT rates have to be considered as a method of enhancing VAT yields.  
Currently, standard VAT rates among SADC Member States range from 10% to 20%.  
Raising VAT rates in the countries with standard rates at the lower end of this range 
represents a credible way of gaining significantly increased yields, but for countries at the 
top end of the range, raising rates can be expected to yield only limited additional 
revenues. 
 
Malawi provides an interesting case study of the revenue effects of varying the standard 
tax rate in the range above 20%.   Malawi, in the latter part of the 1980s, raised its sales 
tax rates significantly in an attempt to close its budget deficit.  It also undertook a major 
tax reform program, which included the conversion of its sales tax, known as the 
“surtax,” to a destination-based, credit-method VAT in 1989.  It retained the name of the 
tax as the “credit-method surtax” and kept the point of the tax at the manufacturing level.   
Prior to the introduction of the credit method structure, Malawi had raised its standard 
surtax rate from 20% to 25% in 1984/85 and again to 30% in 1985/86.  See Table 6.10.  
At that time, the surtax rate on imports was also 20% higher than the surtax rate on 
domestic supplies (for example, a 20% domestic rate was charged at 24% on imports), 
but the large majority of the surtax revenues were collected on domestic sales given 
imported raw materials and capital equipment where exempt inputs by registered traders 
before the credit method was introduced.  As part of the tax reforms, in 1987 the standard 
rate on imports and domestic supplies was made uniform, but raised again to a peak of 
35%.   With the introduction of the credit method in 1989/90, however, the surtax rate 
was lowered to 30%, and then furthered lowered every two years subsequently back 
down to 20% by 1993/94.   
 
The remarkable feature of this roller-coaster tax rate ride that was that the revenue yield 
as a share of GDP only rose modestly from about 4.6% prior to the rate increases to a 
peak of about 6%, and then only declined to 5% as the standard surtax rate dropped from 
35% back to 20%.  Interestingly, the revenue yield stayed in a tight range of 5.3% to 6% 
of GDP as the rate varied between 25% and 35%.    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27   Repeated from Graham Glenday, “Assessment of the Current State of VAT Implementation in SADC 
Member States”  Report prepared for the Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment (TIFI) Directorate of the 
Southern African Development Community, November 30, 2005, Chapter 6, pp76-78 
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Table 6.10.  Surtax rates and revenues,  
Malawi 1982/83-1993/94 
Fiscal yearsa 
Standard Surtax 
Rate (Rate on 
imports) 
Average Surtax 
Revenueb/GDP 
From  To     
1982/83 1983/84 20% (24%) 4.56% 
1984/85   25% (30%) 5.31% 
1985/86 1986/87 30% (36%) 5.54% 
1987/88 1988/89 35% 5.90% 
1989/90c 1990/91 30% 5.96% 
1991/92 1992/93 25% 5.44% 
1993/94 2000/01 20% 4.95% 
a.  Fiscal year is ends on March 31 
b.  Includes Accommodation and Refreshment Tax which was 
incorporated into Surtax in 1993/94 
c.  Credit method surtax introduced in 1989/90 
Source: Ministry of Finance data   
 
This suggests that the price responsiveness of the surtax base was high.  In fact, it 
appears that the standard surtax rate rose into the range of the maximum revenue yielding 
tax rate for the surtax base.   
 
These observations can be analyzed somewhat more formally by considering the price 
effects of raising sales tax rates on the size of the effective tax base of a consumption tax.  
Considering the case of constant cost supply, the revenue yield can be expressed in terms 
the tax base, the tax rate and the price elasticity of demand28 as follows: 
 
taxwithoutquantity
andpricetheatgoodstaxableofdemandofelasticityprice
ratesurtaxndardstat
placeintaxwithoutGDPofshareaassalestaxableofvalueY/pQ
)Y(GDPofshareaasrevenuesoryieldrevenuesurtaxY/R:where
)()t(t)Y/pQ(Y/R
=
=
=
=
+=
η
η 11
 
 
For the revenue yield to fall from 6% to 5% of GDP as the tax rate is reduced from 35% 
to 20% requires a high price elasticity of demand of around –1.5.   Typically for a broad-
based tax such as a VAT, where most of final consumption is targeted, the price elasticity 
of the bundle of all taxable goods is expected to be close to –1, as this implies that total 
consumption will remain at the same expenditure value as the tax rate or price increases.  
If the price elasticity of demand for taxable goods had been about –1 in Malawi, then the 
surtax revenues would have risen to about 7% of GDP (rather than 6%) when the 
                                                 
28 Price elasticity of demand (η) is defined at the prices and quantities that be traded without the tax in 
place as given by p and Q.  The demand curve is assumed to be approximated by a straight line over the 
range of tax rates applied. 
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standard rate was raised to 35%.   It is also of interest to note that at the high price 
elasticity of demand of –1.5, the maximum revenue yield would be reached at a tax rate 
of 33%.   The tax rate yielding the maximum revenues is given  -1/(2η).   This is 
consistent with the revenue yield in Malawi remaining nearly invariant as the surtax rate 
was varied in the range of 30% to 35%. 
 
What are some possible reasons for the price elasticity of demand being high and, 
therefore, variations in the revenue yield being dampened as the Surtax rate changed?  
First, if the tax base exempts a large share of consumption, particularly unprocessed 
foodstuffs that make up a high share of consumption particularly of the poor, then the 
elasticity of demand for the remaining taxed goods can be higher than one.  Similarly, 
exemption of a wide range of services and the prevalence of a large informal sector, with 
turnover rates falling below the minimum turnover level, and large non-monetary sector 
further restrict the taxable base of sales.    
 
The smaller the tax base and with more “luxury” goods that were included in the base (as 
opposed to the exempted necessities such a unprocessed food), the feasibility and 
expectation of a high price elasticity of demand rises with the significant possibilities for 
consumption substitution to untaxed goods and services.  Moreover, a small share of 
luxury goods were subject to high tax rates above the standard surtax rate.  If these high-
tax rate items are substitutes for goods at the standard rate, then the price elasticity of 
goods at the standard rate would be higher, as when the standard rate was raised 
increased luxury surtaxes would be collected masking the decline in revenues from goods 
at the standard rate.  Furthermore, tax compliance is expected to decline as the incentives 
for tax evasion rise with the very high standard tax rates of 30% and above.  This would 
result in an increase in the effective price elasticity of demand for taxable goods being 
observed.   
 
It is important to recognize that the Malawi surtax rate changes occurred without any 
systematic reduction in the average tariff rates charged on imports that would have 
resulted in lower domestic prices and offset the increases in the surtax rates.  Tariff rates 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s were both decreased and increased.  Effective 
import duty collections averaged around 3% of GDP throughout this period.  If tariffs are 
systematically being reduced and replaced with higher consumption tax rates, then it is 
less certain that any increased consumption tax rates will cause any increase in prices.  
The squeezing of the tax base in response to tax-induced price increases, as discussed 
above, will not occur if the duty rate reductions offset the surtax or VAT rate increases. 
 
Summary 
High price elasticity of demand in conjunction with a narrow tax base (less than 50% C-
efficiency, for example) can lead to tax rate increases being an ineffective tool to achieve 
significant revenue increases when the standard rate is already high.  Both tax base 
widening and effective administration are required to enhance revenues directly and 
indirectly to support higher revenue yields from tax rate increases.  The direct revenue 
effects will arise from the effective base broadening.  The indirect effects will come from 
the lower price elasticities of demand of a broader tax base.   
